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RÉSUMÉ 
La corruption est 1 'un des plus anciens problèmes de 1 'humanité. Elle a des effets 
dans de nombreux domaines tels que politique, économique, social et 
environnemental. Se définissant comme un détournement du pouvoir public à des fins 
de profits privés, elle est 1 'un des plus sérieux problèmes auxquels font face les pays 
en voie de développement, mais constitue aussi un défi pour les pays développés. La 
lutte contre la corruption a suscité une attention considérable au cours de la décennie 
passée, et des organisations internationales comme l'ONU, le FMI et l'OCDE ont 
démontré un intérêt particulier pour les mouvements anticorruptions. Le bon sens voit 
la corruption comme une entrave à la croissance, au développement et surtout à 
l'investissement. La littérature qui examine les conséquences de la corruption soutient 
ce point de vue et associe de manière empirique un haut niveau de corruption dans le 
pays hôte à une croissance économique lente ainsi qu'à de faibles afflux 
d'investissement. Pour les investisseurs étrangers, la corruption agit comme une 
barrière au marché' et augmente les coûts d'entrée dans un pays. Cette thèse a pour 
but d'étudier la relation entre corruption et investissement sous trois perspectives 
différentes. 
L'essai 1 cherche le lien entre l'activité de Fusions et Acquisitions (F&A) et le niveau 
de corruption dans le pays hôte. J'émets 1 'hypothèse selon laquelle une activité 
transfrontalière de F &A plus élevée peut accroître la concurrence et introduire de 
nouvelles normes et politiques qui peuvent à tour de rôle réduire le niveau de 
corruption du pays hôte. L'analyse empirique soutient ces hypothèses. 
L'essai 2 analyse les effets de la distance de corruption sur 1 'activité de F &A. Les 
compagnies de pays ayant un faible niveau de corruption n'ont aucune expérience 
dans la gestion de la corruption et sont donc réticentes à investir dans un pays 
corrompu. Or, l'exposition à la corruption domestique prépare les compagnies à faire 
face à la corruption à 1 'étranger. Par conséquent, les compagnies préfèrent investir 
dans des pays ayant un niveau de corruption similaire au leur. Ces hypothèses sont 
appuyées de manière empirique dans 1 'essai. 
L'essai 3 examine l'effet de perception de la corruption par les médias américains sur 
les investissements directs à l'étranger (IDE) des États-Unis. Les médias américains 
rapportent des faits sur la corruption dans d'autres pays. Cet essai étudie l'effet de tels 
faits négatifs sur le niveau d'IDE américain en direction ces pays et constate que la 
Xl 
perception de la corruption par les médias est un déterminant important de l'IDE 
sortant des États-Unis. 
Cette thèse peut apporter un nouveau regard sur notre compréhension de la relation 
entre la corruption et l'investissement étranger. 
Mots clés : Corruption, investissement, fusions et acquisitions, 1 'investissement direct 
à 1 'étranger, média, intégrité financière. 
ABSTRACT 
Corruption is one of humanity's most ancient problems. Corruption has effects on 
many different domains such as the political, econmnic, social and environmental 
spheres. Oefined as the 1nisuse of public power for priva te gains, corruption is one of 
the most serious problems faced by developing countries but is also a challenge for 
many developed countries. The fight against corruption has raised considerable 
attention in the last decade, and international organizations such as the UN, the IMF 
and the OECD have taken a special interest in anti-corruption movements. Common 
sense views corruption as an impediment to growth, development and, more 
importantly, investment. The literature that investigates the consequences of 
corruption supports this point of view and empirically associa tes high levels of host-
country corruption with slow economie growth and low investment inflows. For 
foreign investors, corruption acts as a market barrier to entry and increases the costs 
of entering a country. This thesis aims to study the n1utual relationship between 
corruption and investment frmn three different perspectives. 
Essay one investigates the link between Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity 
and the leve) of corruption in the host country. 1 hypothesize that higher cross-
border M&A activity can increase competition and introduce new nonns and policies, 
which in turn can reduce the host country's leve) of corruption. Empirical analysis 
supports the hypotheses. 
Essay two analyzes the effects of corruption distance on M&A activity. Companies 
from low corruption countries have no experience in dealing with corruption, so they 
are reluctant to invest in a corrupt country. However, exposure to corruption at home 
provides a learning experience preparing the companies to handle corruption abroad. 
Therefore, companies prefer to invest in similarly corrupt countries. The hypotheses 
are empirically supported in the Essay. 
Essay three examines the effects of media corruption perceptions (MCP) on US 
foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows. The US media cover many stories about 
corruption in other countries. This essay studies the effects of su ch negative stories on 
the level of US FOI outflow towards these countries and finds that MCP is a strong 
determinant of US outward FOI. 
This thesis aims to shed new light on our understanding of the relationship between 
corruption and foreign investment. 
Keywords: Corruption, investment, mergers and acquisitions, foreign direct 
investment, media, financial integrity. 
------------------------------------------
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is one of the most ancient problems of mankind. Corruption has effects on 
tnany different domains such as the political, economie, social and environmental 
spheres. In the political scope, corruption hinders democracy and the rule of law 
because public institutions and offices may lose their legitimacy. Corruption tnay also 
reduce political stability, political competition, and the transparency of political 
decision making. In the social sphere, corruption discourages people from working 
together for the common good and the request for and paytnent of bribes becomes a 
' 
social norm. Corruption increases poverty, results in social inequality, and widens the 
gap between the rich and the poor, which leads to a weak civil society. The economie 
effects of corruption are even harsher. Corruption leads to the depletion of national 
wealth. Scarce public resources are squandered on high profile projects, while much 
needed projects such as schools, hospitals and roads, or the supply of potable water 
remains unfunded. In such environments, public wealth is converted to private and 
persona] property, inflation is high, and unhealthy competition prevails. 
In the perspective of finance, corruption is defined as the mi suse of public power for 
private gains. It is an impediment to growth, econmnic development and, more 
importantly, investment. The literature on corruption empirically supports the 
detrimental effects of corruption on both investment and growth at the macro level 
(Mauro, 1995; Meon & Sekkat, 2005; Wei, 2000). This body of literature predicts 
that higher corruption levels lead to lower rates of growth and investment. Mauro 
( 1995) observed a significant negative relationship between corruption and 
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investment that extended to growth. Brunetti and Weder ( 1998) and Mo (200 1) 
confirmed Mauro's findings. Orabek and Payne (2002) argued that corruption has a 
detrimental effect on FOI attractiveness. Rock and Bonnett (2004) argue that 
corruption reduces investment in most developing countries and particularly in small 
open econotnies. This body of evidence proposes that corruption is harmful to 
economie growth, foreign investment, and the developtnent of a country. As a result, 
the fight against corruption is a high priori.ty for international organizations such as 
the IMF, the World Bank, the UN and the OECO. 
The first paper that examines the link between corruption and investment is Mauro 
( 1995), which reports empirical evidence for a negative correlation between 
corrùption and the ratio of inward investment to gross domestic product (GOP) in a 
cross-section of 57 countries. Severa! consequent studies broaden his results and 
foc us on the effects of host country corruption on investment and fi. nd th at corruption 
is a deterrent to inward foreign direct investment (Hines, 1995; Henisz, 2000; Wei, 
2000; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). Habib and Zurawicki (200 1) examine data on 
local and foreign direct investments (FOI) in 111 countries during 1994 to 1998 and 
tind that host country corruption has more of a negative impact on foreign 
investments compared with local ones. According to them, local direct investment 
seems to be substantially (about _2 times) less affected by corruption than foreign 
direct investtnent. 
FOI is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a 
long-term interest and control of a resident entity in an economy other th an th at of the 
investor. Mergers and acquisitions, green-field investments, equity investments, etc. 
are ali types of FOI. Grosse and Trevino ( 1996) and Chen and Chen ( 1998) classify 
the determinants of cross-border FOI into three categories: ( 1) finn-specifie factors, 
(2) location-specifie factors, and (3) measures of the relationship between the source 
and host countries. Location factors such as market size, borrowing costs, unit labour 
costs, and institutional and political stability are critical for the firm's investment 
decision. Corruption is determined by a country's institutional and political 
environ ment, th us high levels of corruption reduce locational attractiveness and have 
a negative in1pact on investors' decision to invest. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) state 
th at " .... [bribe] payments to the host country officiais do not have a market value 
and, hence, rai se the cost of goods when compared to a competitive market. This can 
be a major disincentive for foreign investors" (p. 293). A distinctive feature of 
corruption is its "lock-in" effect. Once in the game, it is very difficult to get out of it. 
, Firms opening their doors for corruption may find it difficult to resist demands for 
bribery payments in the future (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Additionally, firms with a 
reputation for bribing are more likely to receive demands for higher bribe payments 
by corrupt officiais, sometimes even for the services that are normally offered for 
free. Moreover, the threat of mutual denunciation ti es the partners to each other even 
after the bribery transaction. This constant engagement in corrupt actions raises the 
barriers to entry and exit of corrupt tnarkets for foreign investors. Host country 
corruption also rai ses the cost of a finn 's foreign investment, sin ce ( 1) firms are 
expected to pay bribes. Wei (2000) suggests that severe corruption has an effect 
similar to increasing the host country tax rate; (2) they are engaged in resource-
wasting, rent-seeking activities (Murphy et al., 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993); and 
(3) they have to accept additional contract-related risks, because corruption contracts 
are not enforceable in courts (Boycko et al., 1995). Likewise, Javorcik and Wei 
(2009) investigate the effects of host country corruption on FOI inflows and show 
that corruption increases the advantages of having a local partner to navigate 
bureaucratie issues. However, these advantages come at the cost of reducing the 
effective protection of a multinational finn 's intangible assets. A Iso, corruption 
redu ces the productivity of public inputs ( e.g., infrastructure) which, in tu rn, 
decreases a country's locational attractiveness (Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackermann, 
1999; Lambsdorff, 2003). Therefore, corruption in the host country increases the cost 
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of entry and acts as a barrier, reducing finn profits and therefore lowering a firm's 
incentives to invest in the corrupt country. 
This thesis aims to study the link between foreign investment and corruption in three 
essays, each from a different perspective. 
Essay one investigates the effects of investment on corruption. Although corruption 
has a negative impact on foreign investment, the opposite causality also holds. 
Foreign investment can also influence corruption. Many studies scrutinize the effects 
of FOI on host country corruption (Gerring and Thacker, 2005; Larrain and Tavares, 
2004; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003) and find that higher FOI inflows to a country can 
reduce the overall corruption level. However, no study has studied the link between 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) and corruption. M&A is the primary mode of 
internationalization and the pillar of FOI. Contrary to FOI, M&A can have a strong 
influence on the market environment of the host country; can bring new nonns and 
policies; and can increase competition. Thus, they can reduce the national level of 
corruption. Essay one is the first study to exmnine the effects of M&A on the 
corruption lev el of the host country. A panel data fratnework in a cross-section of 50 
countries is us~d to measure the effects of country-specifie institutional, cultural, and 
political variables. The data spans from 1998 to 2013. Wh ile other studies fa il to 
address the problen1 of simultaneity between investment and corruption, Essay one 
tackles this problem by using lagged variables. The results show that M&A are a 
robust detenninant of corruption. Higher M&A levels both in number and in volume 
can lead to lower levels of corruption of the host country. 
Essay two investigates the effects of corruption distance on bilateral M&A. 
Corruption distance, defined as the absolute gap in the level of corruption between 
two countries, can also play a big role in the mnount and value of bilateral M&As 
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between country pairs. Multinational firms exposed to corrupt environments at home 
have a competitive advantage of expertise in n1anaging corruption. However, this 
advantage turns into a disadvantage and becomes useless in transparent markets. 
Alternatively, firms from countries with low levels of corruption have a comparative 
disadvantage in dealing with corruption since they face an additional challenge in 
conducting business in corrupt countries. Thus, companies in corrupt countries prefer 
to invest in similarly corrupt countries, while companies in clean countries opt to 
merge with companies in other clean countries. Essay two hypothesizes that an 
increase in corruption distance between two countries would result in less bilateral 
M&A activity. l investigate the association between corruption distance and mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) in a sample of 60 country pairs. The data spans from 1995 to 
2013. The methodology used to analyze the data is a two-stage approach. By using 
Probit regression in the first stage, 1 study how corruption distance affects the 
likelihood of M&A decisions. Then, in the second stage, 1 en1ploy panel regression 
analysis to examine the effects of corruption distance on the amount of M&A. Essay 
two tinds that corruption distance impacts merger decisions, the number of mergers, 
and the value of n1ergers in a country pair. Firms that experience corruption at home 
tend to merge with firms in countries with similar levels of corruption. 1 also found 
that acquirers in corrupt countries tend to merge with tirms in countries whose 
corruption levels are slightly lower than theirs. 
Essay three looks at the relationship between corruption and US outward foreign 
direct investment (FOI). There is a consensus in the literature that corruption has 
detrimental effects on FOI inflows. However, Essay three looks at corruption from a 
different perspective. 1 use the US media to measure corruption. There are numerous 
news pa pers and journals th at co ver stories about corruption in other countries ( e.g., 
The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Chicago Tribune, etc.). These journals 
are read by many CEOs and top executives, which can affect their perceptions of 
6 
corruption m a foreign country and consequently their investment decision. To 
construct media corruption perceptions of a country, 1 establish a ratio of the number 
of articles containing news about the country's corruption in a given year over the 
number of articles covering trades in the country. Then I investigate a possible 
relationship between media corruption perceptions and the US outward FOI towards 
that country by using a panel regression model. 1 use Factiva to extract the data 
relating to news stories about corruption and the gravity mode) to estimate bi lateral 
trade and FOI tlows. The data spans from 2000 to 2015. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two presents Essay one, which 
is titled "Exporting Transparency Through Mergers". In Chapter three, Essay two, 
titled "Corruption Distance and Cross-Border Mergers", is presented. And finally, 
Chapter four contains Essay three, "Media Corruption Perceptions and US Foreign 
Direct Investment". Chapter five concludes the thesis. 
ARTICLE 1 
EXPORTING TRANSPARENCY THROUGH MERGERS 
ABSTRACT 
Mergers and acqwstttons (M&A) offer a framework for shedding new light on 
corruption. Closed economies are associated with higher possibilities of rent creation 
and extraction. In such economies, a basic remedy to cure corruption is the 
introduction of competition and openness to trade through M&A activity. 1 use the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) developed by Transparency International as a 
measure of corruption in a country. Using a large panel of 50 countries over a 16-year 
period, the results suggest that M&A activity helps countries reduce their leve] of 
corruption. 
Keywords: Corruption, Mergers and Acquisitions, Openness. 
JEL: 073, G34, F30, H 1 O. 
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1.1 Introduction 
''There is no compromise when it cames to corruption. Y ou have to fight it." 
-A. K. Antony, former defence minister of India and member 
of the parliament (as cited in Ullekh, 2012). 
There have been severa] studies on the effects of foreign direct investment (FOI) 
intlows on host country corruption, but no study has investigated the effects of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on the host country's leve] of corruption. This is 
somewhat surprising since M&A are the most important component of FOI. The 
share of M&A in FOI has been increasing in recent years, and M&A have become a 
primary mode of internationalization (UNCTAO, 2000). At the same time, policy 
makers view corruption as a major hindrance to economie growth and development. 
As a result, the fight against corruption has garnered considerable attention and 
international organizations such as the UN, the IMF and the OECD have taken a 
special interest in anti-corruption movements. Corruption is arguably the most serious 
problem in developing countries ( e.g., Bardhan, 1997) and it is a Iso a challenge for 
many developed countries (Kaufmann, 2004). Corruption can only be remedied if its 
causes and determinants are identified. This study aims to demonstrate that M&A 
activity is one of these detenninants and attempts to illustrate its impact on 
corruption. 
Literature on corruption identifies three prerequisites for corruption: the discretionary 
power of public officiais, the association of this power with economie rents, and the 
probability of these officiais getting caught and being penalized (Jain, 2001 ). 
However, the presence of rents is seen as the single most in1portant prerequisite of 
corruption (Braguinsky, 1996) because the existence of economie rents fosters 
corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1997). The possibility of corrupt transactions will 
decrease if bureaucrats have Jess opportunity to extract or create economie rents. As 
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one solution, A des and Di Tell a ( 1997) suggest an economist's approach to control 
corruption by increasing the role of competition and markets, thus lowering the 
chances of the exploitation of discretionary power. Reduced official discretion will 
reduce the potential for corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). 
Focusing on M&A activity as the proxy for openness is reasonable for severa! 
reasons. First, cross-border deals occur frequently and the M&A market is 
voluminous. Second, foreign investors bring new culture, norms and technologies 
which are spilled over to domestic firms. Third, dornestic M&A facilitate the spread 
of these new norms and culture. The presence of foreign investors and multinationals 
along with domestic acquisitions intensifies competition. Moreover, competition 
re stricts the profits of engaging in a corrupt transaction and discourages pub! ic 
officiais frotn initiating corrupt behaviour. Although a closed economy provides a 
fertile ground for corruption activities, competition can hinder corruption. 
As the major component of FOI, M&A introduce more competition in host countries. 
Because M&A are by far the tnain type of investtnent in a foreign country and M&A 
are more effective in introducing change to the target firms through ownership, in this 
study I investigate the effects of M&A on host country corruption. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the tirst study that empirically analyzes the relationship between 
the intensity of M&A and local corruption. Although the leve! of corruption has a 
strong effect on M&A decisions, M&A could decrease corruption. This study may 
bring new insights into our understanding of corruption by addressing the problem of 
simultaneity between M&A and corruption. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, 1 review the litera ture and 
develop the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and methodology; Section 4 
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reports and discusses the empirical results; and Section 5 concludes the paper with a 
discussion of the tnost important implications. 
1.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Corruption is usually understood as the "misuse of public power for private gain", 
where private gain may occur either to the individual official orto the group to which 
they belong. The issue of corruption has attracted the interest of many political 
scientists and economists in recent years. Early studies 1nainly focused on the 
consequences of corruption and showed that corruption deters economie development 
and growth. These bodies of litera ture were pioneered by Mauro ( 1995), who reports 
a significant negative relationship between corruptio.n and investment that extends to 
growth. Severa} consequent studies confirmed and broadened Mauro's (1995) results 
and extended to other macroeconomie variables such as foreign direct investment and 
mergers and acquisitions. Wei (2000b ), Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Lambsdorff 
(2003) focused on the link between corruption and FOI and show that corruption has 
an adverse effect on foreign investment and capital inflows because it renders a 
country unattractive to foreign investors. 
Later studies investigated the causes of corruption to understand why some countries 
exhibit higher levels of corruption than others. Among other factors, competition 
serves as a major cause of corruption and has attracted the interest of many scholars. 
Lambsdorff (2005) contends that in competitive enviromnents, public servants and 
politicians have less to sell in exchange for bribes·, and as a result, they are Jess 
motivated to start a corrupt career. Ades and Di Tella (1995, 1997 and 1999), Sung 
and Chu (2003), and Gerring and Thacker (2005) also find a negative correlation 
between competition and corruption. The literature presents severa} other causes of 
corruption. Government size, institutional quality, degree of democracy, press 
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freedom, national income, and cultural determinants are among the other causes of 
corruption which will be addressed further in this paper. 
The presence of resources that can be easily misappropriated or transferred, along 
with discretionary power in allocating them, nourishes corruption. Closed markets 
with imperfect competition are an important source of rents. In these markets, the 
possibility of corrupt transactions increases when the discretionary power of the 
relevant bureaucrats or public officiais allows extraction or creation of economie 
rents, while these bureaucrats are not held accountable for their actions (Tanzi, 1998; 
Rose-Ackern1an, 1999; Jain, 2001 ). 
Ades & Di Tella (1995, 1997 and 1999) claim that corruption is higher when 
bureaucrats have the potential to extract larger economie rents. They argue that 
openness to international trade will reduce the monopolistic power of domestic 
producers and strengthen market competition, which in turn narrows the rents 
available for bureaucrats to extract. "A natural approach to corruption control is to 
appeal to the concept of competition as it is argued that bribes are harder to sustain 
where perfect competition prevails" (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). They use country's 
openness to trade as an alternative indicator of competition and find that openness, 
defined as the ratio of imports to GDP, is negatively linked to corruption. Sung and 
Chu (2003), Sandholtz & Koetzle (2000), Sandholtz & Gray (2003), and Gerring & 
Thacker (2005) report sitnilar findings. Treisman (2000) also uses the share of 
imports in GDP as a proxy for openness to trade and fails to find a significant 
relationship between exposure to imports · and lower corruption. However, 
Lambsdorff (2005) questions the usefulness of the ratio of imports to GDP as an 
indicator of competition or openness. He argues that this variable is highly dependent 
on the size of a country and can be a good indicator of competition in small countries, 
because large countries can compensate for a low ratio of import to GDP through 
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more competition within their own borders. Moreover, Gerring & Thacker (2005) 
argue that a country may have a high levet of import ratio, but not a particularly open 
economy. Although domestic acquisitions can reduce competition if bidders acquire 
competitors, but this effect is not high enough to be considered in the paper. 
Wei (2000a) applies a measure of "natural openness", which refers to the extent of 
openness in a country determined by its population and its remoteness from world 
trading centres. Using this measure, he finds that natural openness is indeed a 
determinant of corruption, painting out the helpful role of competition in decreasing 
corruption. However, "natural openness" has been criticized because of its 
dependence on population size. 1 
Another possible measure of the extent of competition and open ness of a country is 
its leve] of foreign direct investment (FOI). Larrain and Tavares (2004) use the ratio 
of FOI to GOP as an indicator of openness to trade and empirically find that higher 
exposure to FOI tends to be related to lower corruption levels. Gerring & Thacker 
(2005) also find a similar relationship between trade openness, measured by the ratio 
of FOI to GDP, and corruption. 
As the most important cmnponent of FOI, M&A are also negatively affected by host 
country corruption. Corruption is seen as a market barrier to entry and it is a discount 
on merger synergies (Weitzel and Berns, 2006). Moreover, corruption in a host 
country shitts ownership from wholly owned (acquisitions) to joint ventures (Javorcik 
and Wei 2009). In addition, once a company has made an acquisition, it is difficult to 
resell it, whereas it is much easier to sell off a capital investment. Thus, when a 
company has an incentive to acq.uire or merge with another company, corruption in 
1 See Knack and Azfar (2003). 
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the host country is a matter of great consideration. Wei (2000b) finds evidence th at 
American and European investors are indeed averse to corruption in host countries. 
Cross-national economie ties can limit corruption by increasing its cost. Corrupt 
practices can perpetuate themselves more easily in closed economies, but in open 
markets COITupt officiais would fee] the pinch of international openness. Because 
bribe-paying companies suffer under international competition, they would have Jess 
money to offer, and bureaucrats would find that their corruption-related income 
declines. Greater exposure to international trade thus penalizes corruption. On the 
other hand, open societies not on ly import goods and capital from the rest of world 
but also ideas, policies and nonns. International integration has its domestic 
consequences. Openness to international transactions can introduce policy shifts and 
reform the domestic economies and politics of countries. The effects of international 
interactions are very substantial and can affect nonns and practices that are usually 
determined by local social and cultural factors. Although corruption in a country has 
powerful domestic determinants, it is significantly affected by the leve! of 
international integration and openness. Sandholtz and Gray (2003) investigate such a 
relationship and find that being tied to international networks of exchange, 
communication and organization decreases the leve! of corruption. 
The volume of cross-national mergers and acquisitions has been growing worldwide. 
In the last decades, M&A have become the most important component of capital 
inflows and foreign investment. While the degree of market diversification and 
competition reduces oppor~unities for rent creation, which in turn leads to Jess 
corruption, cross-national M&A activity intensifies competition and fosters openness 
to trade in a country, and as a result, may decrease corruption. As put forward by 
Rose-Ackennan ( 1975), corruption may be Jess frequent if it has long-term negative 
consequences for the firms and individuals involved, as is the case with M&A 
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activity. 8oth cross-national and domestic M&A activity can open the economy to 
international trade and intensify the degree of cmnpetition within a country. Thus, 
total M&A activity can proxy cmnpetition in a host country. 
Closed economtes are associated with higher possibilities of rent creation and 
extraction. In these environments, the introduction of competition and openness to 
cross-border trades can be a basic remedy for corruption. M&A activity can open the 
gates of the economy and increase competition. It can also bring along ideas, nonns 
and policies. In this paper, 1 assess M&A activity for each country through two 
separate measures: the total number of M&A deals per year and the total transaction 
value in US dollars per year. Based on the above analysis on the economie conditions 
affecting the opportunities and costs of corruption in host co un tries, 1 can hypothesize 
that a higher amount of M&A will decrease corruption. 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
1.3.1 The Model 
To measure the effects of country-specifie institutional, cultural, and political 
variables that affect the level of corruption over time, panel data is a rational 
approach. Other studies that investigate the causes of corruption neglected the effect 
of time. Most of the previous studies used a sin1ple OLS regression n1odel, which 
fails to address the effects of time. The dependent variable in the panel regression 
equation is the Transparency International measure of corruption and the independent 
variables are M&A activity measures plus the control variables. The panel model, 
which is used in the empirical analysis to test the hypotheses, is expressed as follows: 
Ci,t = ao + B M i,t-1 +y' Xï,t + Àt + ei + êi,t, (1) 
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Where Ci,t is the leve) of corruption measured by CPI; M i,t-1 is the lagged M&A 
activity measures in country i at time t; Xï,t is the vector of control variables: former 
colony, per capita GDP (lagged), ethnolinguistic fractionalization, oil exporter, 
government expenditure, population, political rights, French legal origins, and 
primary religion; ~ and y are the parameters to estimate; a 0 is the portion of intercept 
that is common to ali years and countries; À1 denotes year-specific effect common to 
ali countries; ei is the source-country fixed effects; Eï,t is normal error terms with 
mean zero and variance 0 2 c; i stands for the country (i = 1, ... ,N); and t stands for the 
year (t = 1 , ... ,T). 1 include in the model the lagged variables of M&A activity and 
GDP per capita to tackle the issue of reverse causality. The prediction of~ is also 
specifie to the openness hypothesis; therefore, 1 hypothesize a positive relationship 
between corruption and M&A. 
1.3.2 Control Variables2 
The abundant empirical literature on the determinants of corruption identifies a series 
of alternative conditions which will affect the analysis and choice of controls.3 
Among the conditions found to affect corruption are: 
2 1 Jimit the report to the variables that are correlated with corruption. A number of indicators 
1 collected were dropped for having no statistically significant relationship with corruption in bivariate 
and/or multivariate tests including sets of regional dummy variables, GDP (log), percentage of 
different religious affiliations, and British, German, Scandinavian and socialist legal origin dummy 
variables. 
3 See Lambsdorff (2006) for an excellent review of this literature. 
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1.3.2.1 Legal Systems . 
The tnost obvious cost of corruption is the risk of getting caught and punished 
(Treisman 2000, p. 402). The probability of getting caught and sanctioned depends in 
part on the country's legal systetn. The civil law system, which is found mostly in 
continental Europe and its former colonies, was introduced in the 19th century by 
Napoleon and Bismarck. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that the civil law system is 
"largely legislature created and is focused on discovering a just solution to a dispute 
(often from the point of view of the State), rather than on following a just procedure 
that protects individuals against the State". Civil law systen1s have largely been an 
instrument of the State in expanding its power and "can be taken as a proxy for an 
intent to build institutions to further the power of the State" (La Porta et al. 1999, 
Treisman 2000). Thus, a civil law tradition is expected to be associated with lower 
governance, Jess efficient governments, and higher levels of corruption (La Porta et 
al. 1999). 
1.3.2.2 Religion 
Religious practices have the potential "to shape national views regarding property. 
rights, competition, and the ro1e of State" (Beek et al. 2003, p. 151; Stulz and 
Williamson 2003; La Port·a et al. 1999). "ln religious traditions such as Protestantism, 
which arose in sotne versions as dissenting sects opposed to the State-sponsored 
religion, institutions of the church may play a role in tnonitoring and denouncing 
abuses by State officiais" (Treisman 2000, p. 403). Since the Catholic and Muslim 
religions tend to li mit the security of property rights and private contracting (Levine 
2005 and Landes 1998), these religions may be associated with lower government 
performance and higher corruption (La Porta et al. 1999). Moreover, Protestant 
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countries have better creditor rights and Jess corruption (Stulz and Williamson 2003). 
Th us, 1 expect Protestant coüntries to have lower levels of corruption. 
1.3.2.3 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 
Corruption is an illegal contract which cannat be enforced by courts. Treis'man (2000) 
argues th at ethnie éommunities and networks may serve as one of the mechanisms to 
"enhance the credibility of the private partner's cmnmitment. In ethnically divided 
societies, ethnie communities may provide cheap infonnation about and even internai 
sanctions against those who betray their coethnics" (Treisman 2000, p. 406). 
Therefore, corruption contracts are strengthened within ethnie communities 
(Treisman 2000). La Porta et al. ( 1999) measure su ch fractional ization and fi nd th at 
higher levels of fractionalization are associated with worse property rights and 
regulation, lower government efficiency, and more corruption. Thus, more corruption 
is expected in societies with ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
1.3.2.4 Political Freedom 
Free association, free press, and regular and open electoral contests can increase the 
likelihood of divulging corrupt activities. Higher political rights enhance the 
opportunity of detecting and punishing those who engage in corruption (Lederman et 
al., 2005). "Countries with more political competition have stronger public pressure 
against corruption - through laws, democratie elections, and even the independent 
press ~ and so are more likely to use government organizations that contain rather 
than maxim ize corruption proceeds" (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, p. 61 0). Moreover, 
Treisman (2007) finds that greater political rights are significantly related to lower 
perceived corruption. 
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1.3.2.5 GDP per Capita 
Some authors suggest that the problem of corruptjon lies in the low salaries 
bureaucrats receive (Treisman 2000). They argue that to reduce the leve) of 
corruption, the wages of bureaucrats and public servants should be raised4• The 
literature empirically shows that wealthier countries are Jess likely to be corrupt. To 
measure the wealth of a nation, GDP per capita is a natural option. Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) a Iso use per ca pi ta GDP as a control for the wealth of a nation. However, there 
is probably some degree of endogeneity between per capita GDP and corruption, 
sin ce corruption and per capita GDP are simultaneously related. 1 address the issue by 
·Jagging the per capita GDP in the analysis. 
1.3.2.6 Fonner Colonies 
Acemoglu et al. (200 1 & 2002) e1nphasize the importance of institutions, shaped by a 
country's colonization madel. Mauro (1997) argues that it is difficult for countries 
that have been colonized to develop efficient institutions. Former colonies are 
considered Jess likely to have developed efficient and transparent local institutions 
because the colonizers' institution models "overlapped (and s01netimes clashed) with 
previously existing informai institutions, fostering social fractionalization and 
hindering the mobility and social change required by the market" (Alonso 2007, p. 
71 ). 1 expect that the countries that have been colonized in the past are more corrupt. 
.J Sec Klitgaard ( 1988) and Besley and McLaren ( 1993). 
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1.3.2.7 Oil Exporter Countries 
Lei te and Weidmann ( 1999) present a mode) where economies abundant in natural 
resources show higher levels of corruption. They find that higher levels of natural 
resources are positively related to higher levels of corruption. Sachs and Warner 
( 1995) show that natural resource economies grow tnore slowly, and they suggest this 
is due in part to a lower efficiency of government. A des and Di Tell a ( 1999) a Iso fi nd 
evidence that oïl and corruption are correlated. 
1.3.2.8 Government Expenditure 
Many contetnporary academie works suggest that a large public sector, measured by 
government expenditure, fosters corruption. The larger the role the government plays 
in the market - as producer and/or consumer - the greater its capacity to engage in 
cm·rupt activity, ceteris paribus. As a rule, "the larger the relative size and scope of 
the public sector, the greater will be the proportion of corrupt acts" (Scott 1972, p. 9). 
1.3 .2. 9 S ize 
To control for the size of the country, 1 use its population because severa) papers 
suggest a relationship between population and government efficiency (Treisman 
2000, Knack and Azfar 2003). 
1.3.2.1 0 Issue of Endogeneity 
There is abundant literature on the negative effects of corruption on openness. These 
studies show how a higher leve) of corruption is associated with lower foreign 
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investment (Hines, 1995; Henisz, 2000; Wei, 2000b, 2000c; Habi~ and Zurawicki, 
2001, 2002). ln this paper, 1 an1 interested precise] y in the opposite direction of 
causa1ity: how a higher degree of country openness affects the leve] of corruption in 
an economy. Since corruption is likely to explain as we11 as be explained by 
openness, the issue of simultaneity becomes key in interpreting the results. Most of 
the studies that address this link fail to deal with or overlook the endogeneity problem 
associated with the two-way causal relationship between openness and corruption. 
Since simultaneous equation models cannot be used simply because it is impossible 
to find an instrwnental variable for corruption, one possible solution to this problem 
is to use lagged variables. 1 address the issue of reverse causality by using lagged 
variables for measures of M&A and GDP per capita. 
The aim of n1odels with lagged variables is to allow for causal effects that linger over 
a period of ti me rather than instantaneous ones5. Wh ile corruption can be explained 
by the same year openness levels, it cannot be explained by the openness in coming 
years. Using lagged variables enables us to tackle the problem of 
endogeneity/sin1ultaneity. 
1.3.3 Data 
Our analysis is based on panel dataset of measures of corruption and its potential 
determinants in 50 countries. Since 1 am combining a nUinber of datasets, 1 have 
different numbers of observations for different variables. This makes the panel 
dataset unbalanced. The data spans from 1998 to 2013. Appendix 1 summarizes the 
5 See Cingolani and Crombrugghe (20 12) for an excellent survey on how to deal with reverse 
causality. 
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definition and sources of ali the variables used m this article with their expected 
stgns. 
I estimate equations explaining corruption indices as a function of openness to trade 
and country characteristics. Since 1 have 16 years of observations and 50 countries, 
the total nUinber of potential observations is 800 ( 16 x 50). However, for some 
countries, CPI is not available for the earl y years in the sample. Moreover, some data 
related to 2013 (for example GDP per capita or govermnent expenditure) is not yet 
available for some countries, which further decreases the number of observations. 
1.4 Results and Discussion 
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the corruption index, M&A activity 
measures and the control variables. As to the measure of corruption, CPI ranges from 
0 to 1 0 and has the maximUin of 10 and minimum of 1 in the sample data. CPI has a 
mean of 3.67 and standard deviation of 2.48, showing that most of the population's 
CPI is not far from the sample mean, indicating the severity of the problem of 
corruption in the world. In measures of M&A, total count per year has the maximum 
of 11,019 and total sum per year has the maximum of 1,589,574 n1illion dollars. 
Fifty-eight percent of the countries in the sample were a colony, 42 percent have a 
French legal origin, 24 percent are Protestant, and 12 percent are oil exporters. 
23 
Table 1.1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable. Obs Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CPI 793 Between 0 and 1 0 5.66 2.48 1 10 
Domestic count per year 800 Cou nt 303.96 917.51 0 8709 
Domestic sum per year 800 Million dollars 25856.70 114292.90 0 1226334 
Cross-border count per year 800 Cou nt 180.48 332.66 0 2580 
Cross-border sum per year 800 Million dollars 19977.50 49955.32 0 492604.8 
Total count per year 800 Cou nt 484.43 1228.60 0 11019 
Total sum per year 800 Million dollars 45834.19 156018.80 0 1589574 
Per capita GDP 799 Dollars 19978.99 19031.53 274 100819 
Former colony 800 Dummy 0.58 0.49 0 
EF 800 Between 0 and 1 0.26 0.25 0.002 0.8567 
Oil exporter 800 Dummy 0.12 0.33 0 
Government expenditure 790 Million dollars 16.42 5.35 2.047121 31.59911 
Population 799 Million 97.00 238.00 3.29 
Political rights 784 Between 1 to 7 2.32 1.74 1 
French legal origin 800 Dummy 0.42 0.49 0 
Primarl: religion 800 Dumml: 0.24 0.43 0 
Table 1.2 presents the patrwtse correlations matrix of dependent and independent 
variables. The two variables Cross-border count per year and Cross-border sum per 
year are highly correlated. Their correlation coefficient is 0.9043, which confirms 
that the two variables actually tneasure the same thing: M&A activity. GDP per 
capita has a slightly high correlation with CPI, which is normal since GDP per capita 
is linked to corruption in the literature. Apart from the aforementioned variables, ali 
other pairwise correlations between the independent variables are not ·high enough to 
cause a possible multicollinearity problem in the model. The correlation coefficients 
between main variables (total sum per year and total count per year) and CPI are 
positive and significant, which shows that lower levels of corruption (higher index) 
are associated with more M&A activity. 
1360.00 
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Table 1.2 
Correlation matrix 
Governme 
Cou.nt per Sum Per Per Capita former Oil Political 
French 
Correlation Matrix CPI 
nt 
EF Population legal 
year Year GDP eolony exporter Expenditur rights 
origin 
CPI 1.0000 
Cross-border 0.3915** 1.0000 
cou nt per yeàr 
Cross-border 0.3010** 0.9043** 1.0000 
sum per year 
Per capita GDP 0.7891** 0.4239** 0.3202** 1.0000 
Former colony -0.4469** -0.3543** -0.3140** -0.5422** 1.0000 
Ethnolinguistic -0.4722** -0.1514** -0.1347** -0.4247** 0.3852** 1.0000 
Fractionalization 
Oil exporter -0.2963** -0.1632** -0.1258** -0.1109** 0.1895** -0.0388 1.0000 
Govcrnment 0.5303** 0.1915** 0.1414** 0.5022** -0.5216** -0.3995** -0.1839** 1.0000 
cxpenditure 
Population -0.2662** 0.1 038** 0.0699** -0.2285** -0.0388 0.2261** -0.0719** -0.1952** 1.0000 
Political rights -0.6048** -0.2984** -0.2444** -0.5760** 0.3921 ** 0.3467** 0.2647** -0.4659** 0.2935** 1.0000 
French legal origin -0.3538** -0.2273** -0.1539** -0.3079** 0.0673 -0.2285** 0.1846** -0.0930** -0.1529** 0.0011 1.0000 
Primary religion 0.421 0** 0.3915** 0.3239** 0.3774** -0.1860** -0.1007** -0.0634 0.3766** -0.1069** -0.3160** -0.4782** 
** Signiticant at the 5% level. 
Figure 1.1 plots the nutnber (Panel A) and dollar value (Panel 8) of cross-border 
deals over the satnple period. 8oth panels show similar patterns. Cross-border M&A 
activity increases throughout the 1990s, declines after the stock market crash of 2000, 
then increases from 2002 until 2007, declines with the economie recession of 2007, 
and stays volatile until 2013. Erel et al. (2012) find the same pattern in M&A activity. 
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Figure 1 .1 Cross-border M&A activity 
1.4.2 Regression Results 
To evaluate the effects of openness to trade and competition on corruption, 1 use a 
multivariate regression framework. Our goal is to analyze how M&A activity can 
affect the leve! of corruption in the host country over ti me. Because 1 am interested in 
the effects of M&A activity on corruption and how changes in M&A activity can 
influence corruption, I use panel analysis. Our dependent variable is the corruption 
index which measures the corruption perception leve] over the entire sample period. 
Our independent variables are the M&A activity measures and severa! determinants 
of corruption suggested in the literature as control variables. 
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Table 1.3 presents random effect panel regression estimates of the determinants of 
corruption as represented by proxies of openness to trade a·nd competition ( domestic, 
cross-border and total M&A activity). The results are revealing. A11 measures of 
M&A activity show significant and positive association to CPI, meaning that these 
activities, decrease the leve] of corruption in host countries. An increase in the level of 
M&A activity leads to an increase in the corruption index, which means less 
corruption. Coefficients of both cross-border sum and cross-border cou nt per year are 
significant and positive, showing that cross-border mergers can increase competition 
and spread the nonns and cultures from the other side of the border. Domestic 
measures also show a positive and significant relation to corruption. This shows that 
domestic mergers also play a big role in decreasing corruption by transferring norms 
to other companies and increasing competition. Coefficients of total activity in a 
country are greater than cross-border or domestic activities alone. This means that 
both cross-border and d01nestic tnergers are important in increasing competition and, 
as a result, reducing corruption. 
27 
Table 1.3 
Panel Analysis of the Determinants of Corruption 
CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log cross-border 0.056*** 
sum Qer i:ear!t-ll (3.52) 
Log cross-border 0.182*** 
count Qer i:ear!t-ll (3.85) 
Log domestic sum 0.034** 
(2.15) 
0.146*** 
count Qer i:ear!t-ll (3.1) 
Log Total sum per 0.057*** 
ear 1_1 (2.78) 
Log Total count 0.206*** 
(3.67) 
-0.889** -0.801** -0.942** -0.846** -0.892** -0.808** -0.929** 
(-2.21) ( -2.09) (-2.3) ( -2.17) (-2.21) (-2.13) ( -2.25) 
Log GDP per 0.172** 0.149* 0.168* 0.127 0.173** 0.107 0.242*** 
caQitap-l) (2.17) (1.76) ( 1. 93) (1.52) (2.1) ( 1.31) (2.83) 
EF -2.177** -2.029** -2.087** -2.116** -2.108** -2.027** -2.112** 
( -2.4 7) ( -2.45) (-2.27) (-2.5). ( -2.39) ( -2.49) (-2.31) 
Oil Exporter -1.184*** -1.05*** -1.125*** -1.063*** -1.156*** -1.02*** -1.223*** 
(-3.12) (-2.8). ( -2.87) (-2.73) ( -3) (-2.7) (-3.09) 
Log Government 0.047 0.063 0.053 0.03 0.05 0.055 0.053 
ExQenditure (0.88) (1.13) (0.95) (0.58) (0.91) (0.97) (0.94) 
Log population -0.705*** -0.739*** -0.752*** -0.766*** -0.722*** -0.784*** -0.683*** 
( -6.24) (-6.92) ( -6.28) (-6.39) ( -6.33) ( -6.98) ( -5.8) 
Political rights -0.083* -0.076* -0.094* -0.085* -0.089* -0.075 -0.082* 
( -1. 7) ( -1.68) ( -1.8) ( -1.78) ( -1.86) (-1.64) ( -1.8) 
French legal -1.241*** -1.195*** -1.231*** -1.179*** -1.242*** -1.165*** -1.23 7* ** 
origin (-2.78) (-2.93) ( -2.68) (-2.73) ( -2. 79) ( -2.84) (-2.71) 
Primary religion 0.757 0.674 0.736 0.686 0.738 0.66 0.784 
( 1.49) ( 1.44) ( 1.4) ( 1.44) ( 1.47) ( 1.44) (1.53) 
Constant 17.357*** 17.696*** 18.414*** 18.667*** 17.594*** 18.624*** 16.767*** 
(8.09) (8.25) (7.98) (8.07) (8.03) (8.51) (7.34) 
Observations 753 768 711 753 763 773 775 
R- 0.75 0.78 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.74 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions of the effects of cross-border and domestic mergers and 
acquisitions on corruption. The dependent variable is corruption perception index (CPI) for the year t and country 
i. To control for endogeneity, some independent variables are lagged one year. Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-
statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
signiticance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respective li:. 
Most of the control variables are significant and have the expected sign. Former 
colony has a negative and significant coefficient in all the models. While higher 
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values of CPI mean the country is Jess corrupt, these results confirm the literature 
stating that former colonies cannot develop efficient institutions and are more corrupt 
(lower CPI). The coefficient of Log per capita GDP is significant for most of the 
mode! specifications. This shows that GDP per capita and corruption are negatively 
associated and higher GDP per capita is linked t~ Jess corruption in a country. 
Entholinguistic fractionalisation is also significant and negative, as predeicted in the 
Iiterature. This shows that more ethnolinguistic fractionalisation in a country is linked 
to higher corruoption. Moreover, Oil exporter dummy is strongly significant and 
negative in ali the M&A measures. As stated before, oil exporter countries are tend to 
be more corrupt. Contrary to what is predicted in the literature, the coefficeients of 
government expenditure are not significant in any M&A measures. The coeficients of 
political rights are also significant and negative. This shows and increase in the 
variable (being Jess politically free) will decrease the CPI (being more corrupt). Thus 
higher political freedom in country is linked to Jess corruption in a country, as 
predicted by the literature. French legal origins dummy is also significant and 
negative stating that countries with civil law systems are tend to be more corrupt. 
Interestingly primary religion is not significant in any M&A measures contrary to 
what is reported in the literature. 
1 .4.3 Robustness Checks 
In this section, 1 use different approaches to test the robustness of the results. 
1.4.3. 1 Alternative Corruption Measure 
To gain robustness, 1 use an alternate measure of corruption in the analysis. The 
Political Risk Services corruption index (ICRG) is another measure of perceived 
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corruption which is widely used in the literature. This is particularly important since 
corruption is measured through surveys on the respondent's subjective perceived 
leve] of corruption. Using different indices of corruption reduces the risk of a 
respondent's misjudgment on their perceived leve] of corruption. The ICRG has a 
correlation coefficient of 0.8864 with CPI. Table 1.4 presents random etfect panel 
regression estimates of the determinants of corruption. The dependent variable is 
ICRG and independent variables are measures of M&A activity. 
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Table 1.4 
Robustness tests, Alternate Corruption Measure 
ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG 
Log cross-border sum per 0.05*** 
ear(t-1) (2.78) 
Log Cross-border Count 0.13* 
Qer ~ear(t-1) (1.68) 
Log Domestic sum per -0.007 
year(t-1) ( -0.47) 
Log Domestic count per 0.128*** 
ear(t-1) (2.89) 
Log Total sum per year(t- 0.033* 
1) ( 1.95) 
Log Total count per 0.15** 
year(t-1) (2.32) 
Former colony -0.396 -0.339 -0.437 -0.369 -0.421 -0.358 
(-1.57) ( -1.3 7) ( -1.64) (-1.49) (-1.64) (-1.46) 
Log GDP per Capita(t-1) 0.079 0.05 0.126 0.029 0.083 O.OlG 
(0.74) (0.41) ( 1.12) (0.26) (0.75) (0.13) 
EF -0.862 -0.726 -0.785 -0.745 -0.807 -0.716 
( -1.65) (-1.54) (-1.54) (-1.62) ( -1.56) ( -1.57) 
Oil Expo11er -0.245 -0.195 -0.332** -0.169 -0.253 -0.173 
(-1.42) (-1.32) ( -2.02) (-0.98) ( -1.44) (-1.12) 
Log Government -0.072 -0.044 -0.138**· -0.074 -0.064 -0.047 
exQenditure (-1.19) ( -0.69) (-2.13) (-1.26) ( -1.02) (-0.73) 
Log population -0.31 *** -0.338*** -0.289*** -0.371 *** -0.317*** -0.376*** 
(-3.61) ( -3.58) (-3.38) ( -4.42) (-3.65) (-4.01) 
Political rights -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.161 ** -0.163*** -0.171 *** -0.158*** 
(-2.74) ( -2.82) ( -2.52) (-2.6) ( -2.69) ( -2.66) 
French legal origin -0.258 -0.219 -0.255 -0.19 -0.257 -0.19 
( -0.95) ( -0.88) (-0.93) (-0.76) (-0.94) (-0.78) 
Primary religion 0.587 0.578** 0.685** 0.58** 0.613** 0.582** 
( 1. 95) (2.1) (2.33) (2.13) (2.09) (2.1 n) 
Constant 8.544*** 9.024*** 8.384*** 9.872*** 8.739*** 9.775*** 
(3.93) (3.8) (3.7) ( 4.42) (3.94) (4.05) 
Observations 759 775 716 759 770 775 
R2 0.64 0.66 0.61 0.66 0.63 0.78 
This table presents estimates of random effect madel of cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions 
activity. The dependent variable is Political Risk Services corruption index (ICRG) for the year t and country i. 
To control for endogeneity, some independent variables are lagged one year. · Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-
statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, resQectivel~. 
The results are similar to Table 1.3 and confirm out results. The coefficients of both 
cross-border sum and count per year are positive and statistically significant. 
Domestic measures show a positive and significant relation to ICRG in at !east one 
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measure, and the coefficients of both total sum and count per year are significant. 
Former colony, GPD per capita, EF and French legal origin do not show significance 
in any measures, but the coefficients of primary religion are statistically significant in 
most of the measures. 
1.4.3 .2 Longer Lags 
Curing corruption is not easy. Corruption is rooted in the quality of a country's 
institutions~ and institutional norms and policies may take years to change. As a 
result, 1 use longer lags in the second robustness checks to see if M&A activity from 
previous years has an effect on corruption. 1 use 2 year and 5 year lags in Table 1.5, 
· which presents estimates of Poo led OLS mode] of cross-border and domestic merger 
and acquisition activity. 
Table 1.5 
Robustness tests, Longer lags 
Lag2 
Log cross-border sum 
per year(t-2) 
Log Cross-border 
Count per year(t-2) 
Log Domestic sum 
per year(t-2) 
Log Domestic count 
per year(t-2) 
Log Total sum per 
year(t-2) 
Log Total count per 
year(t-2) 
Control Variables 
Observations 
R2 
CPI 
0.266*** 
(9.48) 
Y es 
750 
0.82 
CPI 
Log cross-border sum 0.221 *** 
per year(t-5) (8.04) 
CPI 
0.702*** 
(13.53) 
Y es 
768 
0.86 
CPI 
Log Cross-border 0.672*** 
Count per year(t-5) ( 13.48) 
CPI 
0.173*** 
(6.24) 
Y es 
709 
0.81 
CPI 
Log Domestic sum 0.168*** 
per year(t-5) (6.27) 
CPI 
0.52*** 
(11.49) 
Y es 
752 
0.84 
CPI 
Log Domestic count 0.459*** 
per year(t-5) ( 11.59) 
CPI 
0.271 *** 
(8.33) 
Y es 
760 
0.83 
CPI 
Log Total sum per 0.238*** 
year(t-5) (7.55) 
CPI 
0.68*** 
(12.93) 
Y es 
773 
0.85 
CPI 
Log Total count per 0.611 *** 
year(t-5) (12.91) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 741 761 704 746 755 770 
R2 0.82 0.85 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.84 
This table presents estimates of Pooled OLS model of cross-border and domestic mergers and 
acquisition activity. The dependent variable is corruption perception index (CPI) for the year t 
and country 1. To control for endogene_ity, some independent variables are lagged. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided 
in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
res ectivel . 
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Ali measures of lagged M&A activity show significant and positive association to 
CPI, tneaning that these activities decrease the leve) of corruption in host countries. 
The results of this table further confirm the results. 
1.4.3.3 Random Effects vs. Fixed Effect and Pooled OLS 
To check the validity of the random effect model, Table 1.6 compares the random 
effect, fixed effect and poo led OLS results. For reasons of parsin1ony, 1 do not report 
·the coefficients of the random effect mode) which has been reported in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.6 
Robustness tests, OLS vs. Fixed Effect 
Pooled OLS 
CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI 
Log cross-border sum per 0.306*** 
year(t_ 11 ( 1 0.9) 
Log Cross-border Count 0.779*** 
per year(l-l 1 ( 15.3) 
Log Domestic sum per 0.156*** 
year(t-ll (5.53) 
Log Domestic count per 0.557*** 
year(t-ll ( 12.21) 
Log Total sum per year(l-l) 0.293*** 
(8.95) 
Log Total count per year(l-l 1 0.745*** 
(13.93) 
Former colony -0.154 -0.123 -0.27** -0.178** -0.219 -0.168* 
(-1.51) (-1.41) (-2.43) (-1.84) ( -2.09) (-1.85) 
Log GDP per Capita<t-1) 0.475*** 0.09 0.691*** 0.259*** 0.47*** 0.052 
(6.58) ( 1.18) (8.27) (3.21) (5.7) (0.62) 
EF -0.827*** -1.165*** -0.476** -1.017*** -0.739*** -1.131*** 
(-3.63) ( -5.59) ( -1.96) (-4.73) (-3.24) (-5.45) 
Oil Exporter -0.69*** -0.333*** -0.613*** -0.334*** -0.6*** -0.273** 
(-6.06) ( -3.02) ( -4.85) ( -2.88) ( -5.29) (-2.42) 
Log Government 0.134 0.066 0.092 0.069 0.122 0.075 
expenditure ( 1.51) (0.76). (0.92) (0.85) ( 1.38) (0.91) 
Log population -0.66*** -0.837*** -0.579*** -0.847*** -0.681 *** -0.921 *** 
(-17.18) (-19.16) (-12.02) (-17.19) (-14.82) (-18.65) 
Political rights -0.075** -0.082** -0.069** -0.095*** -0.083** -0.091 *** 
(-2.15) (-2.74) ( -1.82) (-2.67) (-2.37) (-2.81) 
French legal origin -1.115*** -1.008*** -1.046*** -0.937*** -1.108*** -0.939*** 
(-11.35) (-11.37) (-10.17) (-10.55) ( -1 1.48) (-11.04) 
Primary religion 0.376*** 0.201 *** 0.47*** 0.19** 0.376*** 0.172* 
(3.48) (2.25) (4.18) ( 1.99) (3.56) ( 1.96) 
Constant 1 0.799*** 16.876*** 8.748*** 16.422*** 11.191*** 18.275*** 
(9.26) ( 12.61) (6.0 1) ( 11.27) (8.4) ( 12.7) 
Observations 753 768 711 753 763 773 
R2 0.83 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.86 
continued on the next page ... 
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Table 1.6 
Robustness tests, OLS vs. Fixed Effect (continuation) 
Log cross-border sum per 
year(l-l) 
Log Cross-border Count 
per year(l-l) 
Log Domestic sum per 
year<t-l) 
Log Domestic count per 
year(l-l) 
Log Total sum per year<t-ll 
Log Total count per year(l-ll 
Former colony 
Log GDP per Capita(l-ll 
EF 
Oil Exporter 
Log Government 
expenditure 
Log population 
Political rights 
French legal origin 
Primary religion 
Fixed Effect 
CPl CPl 
0.046*** 
(3.69) 
0.259*** 
(3.93) 
0.03 
(0.67) 
-1.73*** 
( -4.15) 
-0.067** 
(-2.33) 
0.136*** 
(3.81) 
0.268*** 
(4.04) 
0.044 
(0.96) 
-1.822*** 
( -4.46) 
-0.069** 
( -2.43) 
CPl 
0.028** 
(2.34) 
0.297*** 
(4.53) 
0.04 
(0.79) 
-2.043*** 
( -4.87) 
-0.092*** 
( -3.22) 
CPl 
0.117*** 
(4.22) 
0.219*** 
(3.23) 
0.017 
(0.37) 
-1.61 *** 
( -4.01) 
-0.078*** 
( -2.8) 
CPl 
0.048*** 
(3.5) 
0.27*** 
(4.1) 
0.034 
(0.76) 
-1.743*** 
( -4.28) 
-0.081 *** 
( -2.88) 
CPl 
0.165*** 
(4.71) 
0.225*** 
(3.33) 
0.038 
(0.85) 
-1.784*** 
(-4.47) 
-0.071 ** 
(-2.56) 
Constant 32.811 *** 34.073*** 38.231 *** 31.094*** 32.906*** 33.591 *** 
(4.87) (5.15) (5.61) (4.78) (4.99) (5.2) 
Observations 753 768 711 753 763 773 
R2 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.46 
This table presents estimates of Poo led OLS and fixed em~ct panel model of cross-border and domestic 
mergers and acquisition activity. The dependent variable is corruption perception index (CPI) for the 
year t and country 1. To control for endogeneity, some independent variables are lagged. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix 1. Country and .time fixed effects are included. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
As it is presented in Table 1.5, all the measures of M&A activity are statistically 
significant in both Pooled OLS and fixed effect panel analysis. 1 ran the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects for each of the models, and 1 
conclude that random effect is a more appropriate tnodel than OLS. Moreover, the 
Hausman tests show that fixed effect is actually a better fit, but since the fixed effect 
madel does not take into account the effect of ti me invariant variables (like colonial 
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history or religion), and also ali the coefficients of the variables of interest have the 
same signs and are· statistically significant in both n1odels, 1 preferred to use random 
effect models in the main table (Table 1.3). 
1.4.3.4 Equity Acquisitions Activity 
In order to test the robustness of the results, 1 construct two equity acquisition 
measures: Equity acquisition sum per year and Equity acquisition count per year, 
gauging ali the deals with fewer than 25o/o of shares before the deal and more than 
25o/o of shares after the deal. These new measures also include M&A activity and can 
be a suitable proxy of openness and competition since many cross-border deals are 
actually partial acquisitions. Table 1.7 exhibits the results of random etfect panel 
analysis of the effects of equity acquisitions on corruption. 
Log cross-border sum 
per year(l-1 1 
Log Cross-border 
Count per year11_11 
Log Domestic sum 
per year(l-l 1 
Log Domestic count 
per year{l-1 1 
Log Total sum per 
Table 1.7 
Robustness tests, Equity acquisition activity 
CPI 
0.057*** 
(3.53) 
CPI 
0.184*** 
(3.72) 
CPI 
0.045** 
(2.4) 
CPI 
0.139*** 
(2.93) 
CPI 
0.059** 
(2.68) 
CPI 
0.219*** 
(3.98) 
-0.893** -0.799** -0.937** -0.855** -0.888** -0.808** Former colony 
_________ (_,__-2_.2_2_!._) _ ____l_( -_2___;_08_L) __ (_,__-2_.-''-2." )_~( ---=2~. 1__;_7)L---~(--=-2::...:..:.2::__::_1L..._) -~< -2.13) 
Log GDP per Capita(t-
ll 
EF 
Oi 1 Exporter 
Log Government 
expenditure 
Log population 
Political rights 
French legal origin 
Primary religion 
Constant 
Observations 
R~ 
0.17** 0.149* 0.168* 0.133 0.168** 0.101 
(2.13) (1.83) (1.9) (1.58) (2.04) (1.24) 
-2.177** -2.049** -2.084** -2.118** -2.125** -2.03** 
(-2.47) (-2.47) (-2.32) (-2.5) (-2.42) (-2.5) 
-1.179*** -1.051*** -1.109*** -1.066*** -LI59*** -1.01*** 
(-3.09) (-2_79) (-2.93) (-2./6) (-3.03) (-2.68) 
0.047 0.06 0.035 0.025 0.046 0.052 
(0.89) ( 1.1) (0.57) (0.46) (0.85) (0.97) 
-0_705*** -0.734*** -0.739*** -0.755*** -0.722*** -0.788*** 
(-6.25) C:-6.94) (-6.28) (-6.29) (-6.29) (-7.01) 
-0.082* -0_079* -0.097* -0.088* -0.094* -0.073* 
(-1.67) (-1.77) (-1.85) (-1.82) (-1.93) (-1.66) 
-1.242*** -1.199*** -1.24*** -1.19*** -1.243*** -1.16*** 
(-2.78) (-2.93) (-2.74) (-2.75) (-2.8) (-2.83) 
0.758 0.677 0.735 0.695 0.736 0.663 
(1.49) (1.44) (1.42) (1.45) (1.46) (1.45) 
17.371*** 17.597*** 18.163*** 18.461*** 17.634*** 18.669*** 
(8.08) (8.44) (7.87) (7.92) (8) (8.58) 
755 773 715 756 763 775 
0.75 0.78 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.78 
This table presents estimates of random effect mode! of cross-border and domestic equity 
acquisition activity. The dependent variable is corruption perception index (CPI) for the year t and 
country 1. To control for endogeneity, some independent variables are lagged one year. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiticance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Measures of equity acquisitions, which caver the deals tnaking the acquirer the owner 
of more th an 25% of the total shares, are positive and significant in ali the measures. 
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The more the equity activities, the higher the corruption indices (Jess corruption). The 
results are consistent with Table 1.4, which tests the hypothesis for M&A deals. 
1.4.3.5 Regional Subsamples 
To test the robustness of the sample data, 1 di vide the data into regional subsamples 
and test the hypotheses for each subsample. The regional subsamples are: North and 
South America, Europe, Africa and. the Middle East, and Asia and Oceania. Since the 
subsamples are fairly small, 1 use the simple OLS regression to estimate the 
coefficients. Table 1.8 summarizes the results. Results of domestic M&A activity are 
not shown in the interest of brevity. 
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Table 1.8 
Robustness tests, Regional Subsamples 
North and South America Europe 
CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI 
Log Cross-border 0.161*** . 0.473*** 
sum per year<t-1 1 (3.34) (7.14) 
Log Cross-border 0.482*** 1.13*** 
Count per yearll-l 1 (3.78) ( 1 0.39) 
Log Total sum per 0.192*** 0.48*** 
year(l. 11 (3.48) (6.57) 
Log Total count 0.604*** 1.105*** 
per year([.1 1 (4.16) (9.47) 
former colony 0.253 0.266 0.321 0.458 -1.03*** -1.335*** -1.119*** -1.285*** ( 1.07) ( 1.03) ( 1.38) (1.91) (-5.95) ( -8.42) ( -6.26) ( -8.27) 
Log GDP per -0.499*** -0.633*** -0.562*** -0.727*** 0.109 -0.095 0.141 -0.066 
Capita(l_ 11 ( -3.33) ( -4.03) (-3.58) ( -4.22) (0.66) (-0.61) (0.82) (-0.38) 
EF 
-5.186*** -5.245*** -5.017*** -5.031 *** 0.747 -0.171 0.858 -0.078 
( -8.49) ( -9.22) ( -8.6) (-9.12) ( 1.08) ( -0.28) (1.24) ( -0.13) 
Oil Exporter -1.811*** -1.679*** -1.779*** -1.55*** -0.672*** -0.632*** -0.765*** -0.662*** (-6.37) (-5.95) (-6.11) ( -5.45) (-3.86) (-3.92) ( -4.48) (-3.71) 
Log Government 0.035 -0.014 -0.008 -0.069 0.652*** 0.234** 0.694*** 0.328** 
expcnditure (0.26) ( -0.11) ( -0.05) ( -0.5) (2.93) (2.53) (2.8) (2.31) 
Log population -0.918*** -1.046*** -0.968*** -1.185*** -0.857*** -1.239*** -0.89*** -1.314*** ( -9.25) (-7.46) (-9.31) (-7.9) ( -9.52) (-12.75) ( -9.37) (-11.51) 
Political rights -0.16 -0.087 -0.183 -0.104 -1.826*** -1.043*** -2.286*** 
-1.66*** 
(-1.23) (-0.61) (-1.39) (-0.75) (-5.75) (-3.71) (-5.67) ( -5.1 1) 
French legal -5.393*** -4.848*** -5.331 *** -4.456*** -1.231*** -0.587*** -1.31*** -0.83*.** 
origin (-12.76) (-10.42) ( -13.09) ( -9.07) (-5.78) (-3.39) (-5.87) ( -4.5) 
Primary religion Omitted 1 Omitted 1 Omitted 1 Omitted 1 0.52*** 0.466*** 0.484*** 0.215 (3.27) (3.4) (2.77) ( 1.39) 
Constant 29.822*** 32.13*** 30.91 *** 34.153*** 16.395*** 23.765*** 16.711*** 24.658*** (11. 77) (1 0.65) ( 11.6) (10.72) (7.31) ( 1 0.46) (7.26) (9.22) 
Observations 172 175 172 175 256 256 256 256 
R- 0.87 0.82 0.88 0.80 0.81 0.71 0.82 0.74 
This table presents estimates of OLS regression of cross-border and total M&A activity. The dependent variable is corruption 
perception index (CPI) for the year t and country i. To control for endogeneity, some independent variables are lagged one yeùr. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. ***,**,and * 
denote statistical signiticance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Continued on the next page ... 
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Table 1.8 
Robustness tests, Regional Subsamples ( ... cont'd) 
Asia and Oceania Africa and Middle East 
CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI 
Log Cross-border 0.203*** 0.038 
sum per year{l-ll (4.4) ( 1.41) 
Log Cross-border 0.738*** 0.246*** 
Count per year{l-ll (7.75) (3.04) 
Log Total sum per 0.185*** 0.003 
year11 _1l (3.69) (0.09) 
Log Total count 0.557*** 0.195** 
per year0 _1 l (6.65) (2.62) 
Former colony -0.273 0.22 -0.33 0.259 0.62 0.147 0.647 0.001 (-0.77) (0.72) (-0.93) (0.82) ( 1.38) (0.33) ( 1.53) (0) 
Log GDP per 0.929*** 0.312** 0.954*** 0.479*** 0.563*** 0.507*** 0.65*** 0.518*** 
Capita{l-ll (7.34) (2.05) (7 .24) (3.51) (6.01) (5.62) (7.48) (5.53) 
EF 1.495* -1.156 1.746** -0.461 -0.678 0.939 -0.527 0.935 (1.71) ( -1.35) (2.01) ( -0.54) ( -0.66) (0.78) ( -0.52) (0.85) 
Oïl Exporter Omitted1 Omitted1 Omitted1 Omitted 1 0.154 0.732 0.203 0.884* (0.33) ( 1.42) (0.45) (1.75) 
Log Government 0.063 -0.089 0.011 -0.073 0.112* 0.164** 0.144** 0.16** 
cxpenditure (0.4) ( -0.7) (0.07) (-0.53) (1.76) (2.25) (2.11) (2.14) 
Log population -0.532*** -0.746*** -0.52*** -0.682*** -0.577*** -0.862*** -0.557*** -0.922*** (-6.77) (-9.03) (-6.65) ( -8.64) (-2.77) ( -3.55) ( -2.74) ( -3.92) 
Political rights -0.018 -0.085** -0.007 -0.024 -0.327*** -0.218*** -0.307*** -0.209*** ( -0.44) ( -2.22) (-0.16) ( -0.68) (-4.47) (-3.43) (-4.42) (-3.49) 
French legal -1.142*** -0.849*** -1.23*** -0.886*** 0.216 0.951 0.227 0.96 
origin ( -6.27) (-4.97) ( -6.88) ( -5.11) (0.39) ( 1.44) (0.41) ( 1.56) 
Primary religion 0.618** -0.18 0.764*** 0.132 -0.066 -0.022 -0.094 0.136 (2.15) ( -0.62) (2.69) (0.47) (-0.21) ( -0.08) ( -0.32) (0.5) 
Constant 4.687*** 13.839*** 4.275*** 1 0.857*** 9.812*** 13.432*** 8.753*** 14.392*** (2.13) (5.32) (1.99) (4.92) (3.18) (3.78) (2.99) ( 4.07) 
Observations 212 215 215 216 113 122 120 126 
R- 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91 
.. Thts table presents est1mates of OLS regresston of cross-border and total M&A acttvtty. The dependent vanable 1s corrupt1on 
perception index (CPI) for the year t and country i. To control for endogeneity, some independent variables are lagged one ycar. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. ***, **,and * 
denote statistical signiticance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
1 The variable is omitted because of collinearity. 
Except for Africa and the Middle East, ali the other subsamples have positive and 
statisticaliy significant coefficients for ali the measures of M&A activity, which 
confirms the idea that M&A activity can reduce the level of corruption in these 
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subsamples. As for Africa and the Middle East, at ]east one of the two M&A activity 
pairs (sum or count) is statistically signifïcant, which further confirms the results. 
1.4.3.6 Outliers 
To identify the outliers, l used a scatter plot to visually identify the possible outliers. 
Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 show the scatter plot for total count per year and total sum 
per year vs. CPI index. A cursory look at these graphs suggests that the United States 
and the United Kingdom are indeed outliers. As a robustness check, l remove these 
two countries from the sample data and run regressions to determine the effect of 
M&A activity on corruption. Table 1.9 sums up the results of random effect mode! 
panel regression. The results of this table match the previous results and support the 
hypothesis. ln fact, these outlier countries do not affect the results. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
~ 
0 
0 2 4 6 
CPI 
• 
••• 
• 
•• • 
• 
• 
8 10 
The horizontal line represents corruption perception index and the vertical linc represents the total 
count per year. Circled observations are noteworthy.' 
Figure 1.2 Scatter plot of total count per year and CP! 
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The horizontal line represents corruption perception index and the vertical li ne represents the total 
count per year. Circled observations are noteworthy. 
Figure 1.3 Scatter plot of total sum per year and CPI 
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Table 1.9 
Robustness tests, removing outliers 
CPI CPI CPI CPI 
Log Cross-border sum per year(t-I) 0.054*** (3.38) 
Log Cross-border 0.173*** 
Count 12er ~ear(t-I l (3.67) 
Log Total sum per year (t-Il 0.053*** (2.62) 
Log Total count per year <t-Il 
. 0.192*** 
(3.45) 
Former colony -0.813** -0. 738* -0.814** -0.749** ( -2.03) ( -1.93) ( -2.03) ( -1.97) 
Log GDP per Capita(t-Il 0.19** 0.168** 0.192** 0.13 (2.42) (2.01) (2.36) ( 1.61) 
EF -2.09** -1.955** -2.021 ** -1.958** ( -2.432 ( -2.4) ( -2.35) ( -2.43) 
Oil Exporter -1.166*** -1.04*** -1.139*** -1.016*** ( -2.99) (-2.72) ( -2.88) (-2.63) 
Log Government expenditure 0.056 0.073 0.06 0.065 (0.97) ( 1.21) ( 1.01) (1.06) 
Log population -0.737*** -0.763*** -0.752*** -0.803*** ( -5.96) (-6.51) ( -6.02) ( -6.56) 
Political rights -0.082* -0.075* -0.088* -0.075 ( -1.67) ( -1.67) (-1.84) (-1.63) 
French legal origin -1.232*** -1.19*** -1.233*** -1.163*** ( -2.78) (-2.91) (-2.79) ( -2.83) 
Primary religion 0.593 0.536 0.572 0.53 ( 1.12) ( 1.1) ( 1.09) ( 1.1) 
Constant 17.659*** 17.886*** 17.866*** 18.721*** (7.66) (7.82) (7.61) (8.05) 
Observations 721 736 731 741 
R2 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.78 
This table presents estimates of random effect model of cross-border and total M&A activity. The dependent 
variable is corruption perception index (CPI) for the year t and country i. To control for endogeneity, some 
independent variables are lagged one year. Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiticance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
This paper n1akes a systematic attempt to estimate the effects of openness to mergers 
and acquisitions on corruption and addresses the issue of reverse causality by using 
lagged variables. 1 use two different measures of corruption (CPI and ICRG) and two 
different measures of M&A activity on a sample of 50 countries during the 1998-
2013 period. Our results indicate th at M&A activity is a robust determinant of 
corruption. More M&A activity results in lower national levels of corruption in a host 
country. This result is robust due to result confirmation in a series of robustness 
checks. 
The literature has previously suggested that higher corruption levels deter foreign 
direct investment and mergers and acquisitions. Here 1 find that the opposite causality 
also holds; higher merger and acquisition activity is shown to deter corruption. 
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APPENDIX 1.1 
Definitions and expected signs of the variables 
Variable Name 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
1 nternational 
Country 
Risk 
Guide 
Cross-border count 
per year 
Cross-border sum 
per year 
Oomestic count 
per year 
Definition and Source 
Corruption indices: 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is the index produced annually by 
Transparency International. This index has become a widely used measure of 
corruption in the literature. lt is an aggregated, standardized "poli of polis" of 
experts, international business people, and citizens of each country covered. 
Every score thus captures the perceptions of both foreigners and nationals of 
the country being assessed. Transparency International uses a definition of 
corruption similar to ours: "the misuse of public power for private benetit." 
The index assigns a score, ranging from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt), 
to each country for each year. As of 2013, Transparency International decided 
to present the index ranging from 0 to 100. For simplicity the index is divided 
by 1 0 for 2012 and 20 13. Source: Transparency 1 nternational, various years. 
The International Country· Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index is an index 
produced by Political Risk Services. This index is a survey-based indicator, 
which has beén widely used in the economies literature. This index is produced 
monthly. 1 use the average of the months of each year as the index for that 
year. The index scales from 0 to 6. Low scores on the ICRG corruption index 
indicate that "high government officiais are likely to demand special 
payments". Source: Political Risk ServiCes, various years. 
Merger and Acquisition activity: 
As a measure of M&A activity, 1 calculate the natural logarithm of the number 
of ali cross-national deals which happened in a year for each country, whether 
the country was the target or the acquirer. 1 include only deals for which the 
acquirer owns less than 50% of the shares prior to transaction and owns at !east 
50% of the shares after the transaction. Oeals with no information about before 
or after percentage of shares owned are excluded. The data is collected from 
Thomson Reuters's SOC Platinum database spanning from 1998 to 2013. 
1 have another measure of M&A activity, which is the natural logarithm of the 
SUlll of ali cross-national qea(s' transaction value in US dollars, whether the 
country was the target or the acquirer. The deals with no information on deal 
value, or deals which did not make the acquirer the owner of 50% of the shares 
werc excluded. Our data is taken from Thomson Reuters's SOC Platinum 
data base for the years 1998 to 2013. 
This variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of domestic M&A 
deals per year in a country. 1 excluded the deals which did not make the 
acquirer a controlling shareholder (more than 50% of the shares) or the deals 
Expected 
Si n 
+ 
+ 
+ 
·oomestic sum 
per year 
Total count 
per year 
Total sum 
per year 
Former colony 
Per capita GOP 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractional ization 
Oil exporter 
Go vern ment 
expenditure 
Population 
Political rights 
French legal origin 
Primary religion 
which the acquirer was already a controlling shareholder. The data is 
downloaded from Thomson Reuters's SOC Platinum database. 
This variable is the natural logarithm of the total domestic transaction value in 
US dollars. The deals which do not pass the ownership of 50% of the shares 
are excluded. This variable is downloaded from Thomson Reuters's SOC 
Platinum database. 
1 construct this variable as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
domestic and international deals in a country. This variable is simply a natural 
logarithm of the sum of Cross-border count per year and Oomestic count per 
year. 
This variable is the natural logarithm of the total value of the cross-national 
and domestic deals in a country per year. The variable is the sum of Cross-
border sum per year and Domestic sum per year. 
Control Variables: 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country was a former 
colony after 1825 and zero otherwise. Source: Barro and Lee ( 1994). 
is the natural logarithm of the per capita GOP in US dollars. Source: World 
Bank and Taiwan National Statistics. 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (EF) measures ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, which is the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals within a country belong to the same religious and ethnie group 
scaling from 0 to 1. Source: La Porta et al. ( 1999). 
is a dummy variable for oil-exporting countries. The dummy takes the value of 
1 if the country's fuel export is more than 30% of the total merchandise 
exports. Source: World Bank. 
is the natural logarithm of the government tinal consumption expenditure as a 
share ofGOP. Source: World Bank and Taiwan National Statistics. 
is the natural logarithm of the total population of a country. Source: World 
Bank and Taiwan National Statistics. 
is tl~e degree to which people are free to participate in the political process, 
freedom to vote for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, freedom to 
compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect 
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are 
accountable to the electorate. This index is scaled from 0 to 7, where 1 denotes 
high political freedom. Source: Freedom House. 
i.s a dummy variable denoting if the legal origin of the country is civil French 
law. Source: La Porta et al. ( 1999). 
is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the primary religion of the 
country is Protestant. Source: La Porta et al. ( 1999). 
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ARTICLE II 
CORRUPTION DISTANCE AND CROSS-BORDER MERGERS 
ABSTRACT 
National borders can act as an extra element to be considered in the cost-benefit 
analysis of tnergers since they are accompanied with additional sets of frictions that 
can hinder or motivate mergers. Corruption distance, defined as the absolute gap in 
the level of corruption between two countries, plays a big role in the amount and the 
value of bilateral mergers between country pairs. Exposure to corruption in the home 
country provides a learning experience, preparing potential investors to better handle 
corruption in the markets abroad. Thus, firms in corrupt countries tend to merge with 
firms in similarly corrupt countries. Converse! y, firms with no experience of handling 
corruption at home tend to merge with firms from other clean countries. Using a 
large panel of 61 countries over an 18-year period, 1 fi nd that corruption distance has 
a significant effect on merger decisions as weil as on the number and value of 
mergers. As the corruption distance increases, 1 observe fewer mergers within the 
country pairs. 1 also find that acquirers in corrupt countries tend to merge with firms 
in countries whose corruption leve! is slightly better (lower) than theirs. 
Keywords: Corruption, corruption distance, mergers and acquisitions. 
JEL: 073, G34, F30. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The volume of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has been increasing 
over the last decade (UNCTAD 2004, 2014). In general, tnergers occur when the 
acquiring firm 's managers perce ive that the value of the combined finn is grea ter than 
the sum of the values of the separate firms. In practice, most co un tries compete over 
the incentives to attract foreign investors believing that foreign investment can have 
significant positive effects on development. Simultaneously, governments encourage 
domestic firms to invest abroad for the purpose of developing a target industry. 
Somehow, cross-border M&A are currently the dominant policy issue for both 
acquirers' and target firms' hotne countries. However, in cross-border mergers, 
national borders can act as an extra element to be considered in the cost-benefit 
analysis because they are accompanied with additional sets of frictions that can 
hinder or motivate mergers. Geographie distance, cultural distance, differences in 
language, religion, income tax rates, and political stability along with many other 
factors can impede cross-border M&A. In this paper, 1 introduce another important 
issue: the jmpact of corruption distance on the decision and volume of M&A. 
Corruption, roughly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain, is found to 
inhibit growth (Mauro, 1995), -reduce the legitimacy of government (Anderson and 
Tverdorva, 2003), and deter foreign direct investment (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; 
Aizenman and Speigel, 2006). Corruption distance, which is defined as the absolute 
gap in the levet of corruption between two countries, can also play a big role in the 
amount and value of bilateral M&A between country pairs. ln this paper, 1 study 
corruption distance as a determinant of bilateral M&A. First, 1 estimate the extent to 
which corruption distance influences the decision of firms to merge by using the 
Pro bit madel. 1 th en use panel analysis to measure the effect of corruption distance on 
the volume of M&A. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I review the litera ture and 
develop the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and methodology; Section 4 
reports and discusses the empirical results; and Section 3 concludes the paper with a 
discussion of the most important implications. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Corruption plays a prominent role on the agenda of international organizations and 
national governments, which exp lains the increasing number of studies investigating 
the links between corruption and investment. This line of literature focuses mainly on 
the Iink between host country corruption and foreign direct investment (FOI) and 
asserts that corruption in the host country increases the cost of entry and acts as a 
barrier, reducing the profits of firms and therefore lowering a firm's incentives to 
in v est in that country. In a seminal paper, Mauro ( 1995) finds that co un tries with 
higher corruption levels have low ratios of both total and private investment to GDP. 
Hines (1995) finds that corruption significantly reduces inward FOI. Using data of 
the l990s from 12 source countries to 45 host countries, Wei (2000a) finds that 
corruption has a significant negative effect on FOI. Similarly, Orabek and Payne 
(2002) show that non-transparency, which consists of corruption, negatively impacts 
FOI. Sanyal and Samanta (2008) examine US FOI outtlows with respect to the leve) 
of cor~uption in 42 host countries over a five-year period and fi nd that US firms are 
Jess likely to invest in countries where bribery is prevalent. 
2.2.1 Corruption as a tnarket barrier to entry 
Rose-Ackerman ( 1999) introduced a distinctive feature of corruption which is its 
"Jock-in" effect. Once in the game, it is very difficult to get out. Firms that open their 
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doors to corruption may find it difficult to resist demands for bribery payments in the 
future. Additionally, firms with a reputation for bribing are more likely to receive 
demands for higher bribe payments by corrupt officiais, sometimes even for the 
services that are normally offered for free. The threat of mutual 'denunciation ti es the 
partners to each other even long after the exchange. This constant engagement in 
corrupt actions raises the barriers to entry in corrupt markets for foreign investors. 
Host country corruption can also rai se the cost of a firm 's foreign investment, as ( 1) 
firms are expected to pay bribes since severe corruption has an effect similar to 
increasing the host country's tax rate (Wei, 2000a); (2) firms are engaged in resource-
wasting, rent-seeking activities (Murphy et al., 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993); and 
(3) firms have to accept additional contract-related risks, because corruption contracts 
are not enforceable in courts (Boycko et al., 1995). 
In a corrupt enviromnent, to circumvent the barrier problems and be able to gain 
access to that corrupt host market, international firms sometimes seek and employ 
brokers, middlemen, and local partners (Henisz, 2000; Javorcik and Wei, 2009; 
Lambsdorff, 2002). Because outside firms are not usually accustomed to such a 
cmTupt environment, local partners can help them find their way in this environment. 
Javorcik and Wei (2009) show that corruption increases the advantages of having a 
local partner to navigate bureaucratie issues.6 However, these advantages come at the 
cost of reducing the effective protection of a multinational finn 's intangible assets. In 
addition, local firms increase the relative importance and bargaining power of the 
target, which can also add to the costs incurred by a company to enter a corrupt 
country. 
6 Javorcik and Wei (2009) also indicate that corruption shifts the ownership structure from 
mergers to joint ventures. 
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2.2.2 Exposure to corruption at home 
Exposure to corruption in the hon1e country provides a learning experience preparing 
potential investors to better handle corruption in the markets abroad. Therefore, 
acquiring skills in managing corruption helps develop a certain competitive 
advantage. Andvig (2002) suggests that multinational firms exposed to corrupt 
environments typically have learned the organizational and financial techniques 
required to keep bribes and illegal transactions secret. However, this competitive 
advantage of expertise in managing corruption turns into a disadvantage and becomes 
useless in transparent markets. On the other hand, firms from countries with low 
levels of corruption have a comparative disadvantage in dealing with corruption, so 
that they face an additional challenge in conducting business in COITupt countries. 
Inability to handle corruption makes cross-border investment challenging for 
companies from Jess corrupt countries and can result in a negative investment 
decision. Therefore, multinationals from corrupt countries have a stronger tendency 
to invest in corrupt countries than their counterparts from Jess corrupt countries-, 2nd 
firms from cleaner countries prefer to invest in other clean countriés to avoid 
additional costs associated with the difference in corruption levels. 
2.2.3 Corruption distance and investment 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Wu (2006) find that the difference in corruption 
levels between the host and source countries is an important barrier for foreign 
investors. They analyze the absolute differences in perceived corruption leve) 
between the investors' home .and host co un tries as one of the in dependent variables 
and tind that similarity in overall corruption positively affects the bilateral FDI tlows. 
In other words, companies from Jess corrupt countries prefer to invest in a similar 
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environment, and finns from corrupt countries would rather invest m similarly 
corrupt countries. 
Corruption in a host location can be viewed from a cost/benefit perspective that will 
deter foreign investors if the costs of the potential deal exceed its benefits (Rose-
Ackerman, 2008). This might suggest that while some firms with no experience in 
dealing with corruption at home tnight be at a disadvantage when operating in highiy 
corrupt foreign countries, the satne may not be true for firms familiar with operating 
in highly corrupt home countries. MNEs with knowledge of dealing with corrupt 
environments at home may be encouraged by their location-bound ownership 
advantages and willing to invest in similar locations. Thus, when analyzing how 
corruption affects investment, it is important to know if strategie knowledge of 
coping with corruption may be acquired at home by some firms and redeployed 
abroad without incurring high costs. 
2.2.4 Corruption distance and M&A 
Previous literature on the determinants of M&A tnainly focuses on the economie 
determinants of mergers by using the gravity mode1 7 of trades. This li ne of literature 
argues that geographical distance between the two countries as we11 as the size of 
the ir economies (measured by GDP) affect the volume and intensity of mutual M&A 
(e.g., Di Giovanni, 2005). More recently, researchers have investigated the 
noneconomic determinants of mergers and have included corporate governance 
differences and cultural affinities in the gravity equation (Rossi & Volpin, 2004; Bris 
and Ca bol i, 2008; and A hern et al., 20 12). A hern et al. (20 12) fi nd th at culture has a 
7 The "gravity mode!" has been the workhorse mode! for trade in goods since the 1960s. lt' 
explains trade tlows between two countries by the size of their economies (GDPs) and distance. Sce 
Rose (2000). 
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significant and economically meaningful effect on the volume of cross-border 
mergers and show that culturally distant countries have a lower volume of cross-
border mergers. They argue that similar to the gravity literature, both physical and 
cultural distances should decrease the likelihood that two firn1s in different countries 
choose t<;> merge. 
In the literature, only a few empirical studies analyze the effect of corruption on 
cross-border M&A and simultaneously consider country-leve] characteristics as weil 
as institutional attributes. Henisz (2000) and Sm.arzynska and Wei (2000) show that 
corruption affects the decision of the firm to enter a country as majority owner or to 
form a joint venture. Erel et al. (20 12) use a sample of 56,978 cross-border mergers 
occurring between 1990 and 2007 to investigate the detern1inants of cross-border 
mergers. They construct an index of institutional quality by summing up corruption, 
law and order, and bureaucratie quality. However, they fail to show a negative link 
between the institution quality index and the volume of mergers. In a separate paper, 
Weitzel and Berns (2006) find negative effects of corruption on target premiums. 
Low corruption levels indicate Jess risk of opportunism, which may create a 
favourable environment for investment. For foreign investors who are not familiar 
with the rules of the gatne in the host country, the leve] of corruption may be a deal 
breaker. But foreign investots who have experience in dealing with corruption in their 
home country may find the corrupt environment more favourable than a clean 
environment. In this paper, 1 contend that M&A are intluenced by corruption levels in 
home countries as weil as corruption in host countries. 1 define corruption distance as 
the absolute difference in the corruption leve! of home and host countries and posit 
that it can hinder mutual M&A the satne way that cultural or geographical distances 
do. 
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The findings of this paper are consistent with the hypothesis. 1 find that corruption 
distance between two countries influences both the likelihood of mergers and the 
number of n1ergers. Corruption distance also reduces the value of mergers between 
two countries. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that empirically analyzes the 
relationship between corruption distance and the volume of mergers and acquisitions. 
It may therefore provide new insights into corruption and may also add to the analysis 
of international M&A. 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 The Model 
To study the effects of corruption distance on mergers, 1 base the methodology on the 
gravity mode) framework where bilateral trades are positively related to size of the 
two countries (measured by GDP) and inversely related to the geographical distance 
between the two. In the analysis, 1 also use corruption distance as one of the factors 
that can hinder bilateral mergers. 
1 use a two-stage model to investigate the effects of corruption distance along with 
country-specifie institutional, cultural, and political variables on M&A. In the first 
stage, 1 estin1ate Probit models that predict the probability of an observed cross-
border merger decision between a country pair as a function of corruption distance 
and control variables. Once a positive decision is made in the first stage, 1 examine 
the determinants of the amount of M&A to be invested in the second stage by 
calculating the inverse Mills ratio and include it in the second stage equation. 1 
employ panel regression estimation to analyze the magnitude of corruption distance 
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effects in the second stage. In both models, 1 measure the effects of corruption 
distance of the same year on M&A activity simply because the investors take into 
account the corruption distance of the year th at they want to in v est. 
The dependent variable in the Probit mode! equation is a dummy which takes the 
value 1 if there was at !east one merger between the country pair in a specifie year. 
Our variable of interest is corruption distance and 1 include a vector of control 
variables. The Probit mode!, which is used in the en1pirical analysis to test the 
hypotheses, is expressed as follows: 
Dïj,t = a+ ~ CorDist ij,t + y Xij,t + ~ij,t, (1) 
Where Du,1 is a dummy indicator with Dij,1= 1 if there was at !east one merger between 
country i and country j at the time t, and 0 otherwise; CorDist ij,t-1 is the lagged 
corruption distance between country i and j at time t; Xij,t is the vector of control 
variables: population, GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, physical distance, 
Corruption Percept~ons Index, political stability, cmnmon language, common 
religion, unemployment rate, disc1osure quality, annual returns, and corporate income 
tax; ~ and y are the parameters to be estimated; a is the portion of intercept that is 
common to ali years and countries; ~i.i.t is normal error terms with mean zero and 
variance cr21:; i and j stand for the countries; and t stands for the year (t = 1 , ... ,T). 
The second stage of the analysis is random effect panel regression estimation. 1 use 
the volume and number of bilateral M&A in a country pair in a year as the dependent 
variable and the independent variables are the corruption distance along with control 
variables. Trye panel mode! used in the second stage analysis is expressed as follows: 
Log (M&Au,1) =a+ ~ CorDist i.i,t +y Xïj,t +co Millsij,t + Àt + 8ï + tï_i,t, (2) 
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Where M&Aïj,t is the volume or the number of bilateral M&A between country i and j 
at the ti me t; CorDist ij,t is the lagged corruption distance between country i and j at 
ti met; Xij,t is the vector of control variables: population, GDP, GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, physical distance, Corruption Perceptions Index, political stability, common 
language, common religion, unemployment rate, disclosure quality, annual returns, 
and corporate in come tax; Mills is the inverse Mills ratio calculated from model ( 1 ); ~ 
and y and w are the parameters to be estimated; a is the portion of intercept that is 
common to ali years and countries; Àt denotes year-specific etTect common to ali 
country pairs; ei.i is the country pair fixed effects; €ïj,t is normal error terms with mean 
zero and variance cr2 r:; i and j stand for the countries; and t stands for the year (t = 
l, ... ,T). 
2.3.2 Control Variables 
The gravity model (e.g., Hamilton and Winters, 1992) predicts that the bigger the size 
of the economies and the smaller the distance, the greater the bilateral international 
tlows. There are standard control variables included in the basic gravity models. As 
gravity literature suggests (Hyun and Kim, 201 0), 1 use GDP and population as 
proxies for the size of the economy because GDP levels measure the market size of 
the economy and potential demand for bilateral imports in the host country and the 
potential supply from the source country. Also, high GDP per capita retlects high 
consumption potential in the host country (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). 1 utilize GDP 
growth as a proxy for the change in macroeconomie conditions (Rossi and Volpin, 
2004 ). Physical distance serves as a pro x y for transportation and transaction costs 
associated with trade and retlects the resistance to bilateral trade. 
Since a COI)lmon culture potentially makes mergers more likely, 1 additionally include 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target and acquirer share a primary religion (Same 
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Religion), and another dummy variable equal to if they share a primary language 
(Same Language). Moreover, because of the possibility that international tax 
differences could motivate cross-border mergers, 1 also include the average difference 
in corporate income tax rates between acq~irer and target countries in 1990 (Income 
Tax). 
Country leve! unemployment rate has been considered a proxy for labour availability 
(Habib and Zurawicki, 2002) and attractiveness of the host coùntry (Godinez and Liu, 
20 15). Th us, 1 use the host country's unemployment rate as a control variable 
(Unemployment Rate). Erel et al. (20 12) suggest th at differences in exchange rate 
returns as weil as country-leve! stock returns in local currency predict the volume of 
mergers between specifie country pairs. 1 include the annualized 12-month stock 
return difference of the country indices measured in local currency over the sample 
period for each country pair (Annual Returns). Unfortunately, the annual returns data 
are not available for ali the countries and years of the sample. Furthermore, because 
regulatory and legal differences between countries potentially affect cross-border 
acquisitions (Rossi and Volpin, 2004), 1 include as independent variables the 
difference in the index on the quality of their disclosure of accounting information 
(Disclosure Quality). 
Uncertain political situations can make investors and public otTicials short-term 
oriented and lead them to pursue persona! gains while sacrificing legality. 
Alternatively, a stable political environment encourages a long-term orientation and 
reduces incentives for quick illegal returns. 1 include Political Stability as the measure 
of location attractiveness of a host country. 
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2.3.3 Data 
The data used in this paper are generated from several datasets. First, 1 identify 
mergers and acquisitions with announcement dates between. 1995 and 2013 using the 
Securities Data Company (SOC) Mergers and Acquisitions database. 1 require that 
the acquisition be cmnpleted and that acquirers gain more than 50o/o of shares of the 
target after the transaction. 1 obtain relevant data from the SOC including the 
acquisition announcement date and the value of the transaction. 1 merge the sample of 
acquirers and targets with the Bloomberg database to obtain financial data. Our 
dataset spans from 1995 to 2013. Appendix 1 sun1marizes the definition and sources 
of ali the variables used in this article with their expected signs. 
To analyze the cross-national patterns among acquirers and targets more formally, 1 
use a two stage model: the Pro bit model and multivariate regression framework. Our 
goal is to measure the factors affecting the decision and the propensity of firms from 
one country to acquire finns from another country. Our dependent variable in the first 
stage is a dummy that takes the value 1 if there was at Ieast one merger between the 
country pair in a year. Our dependent variable for the second stage is the number or 
the volume of mergers between each country pair in a year. 1 have 61 countries and 
the dataset spans from 1995 to 2013, th us the total number of potential observations 
is 69,540 (61 x 60 x 19). 
1 limit the report to the variables that are correlated with M&A. A number of 
indicators 1 collected were dropped for having no statistically significant relationship 
with M&A in first and/or second stage tests including sets of regional dummy 
variables, percentage of different religious affiliations, and British, German, 
Scandinavian and socialist I,egal origin dummy variables. 
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2.4 Results and Discussion 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the corruption index, M&A activity 
tneasures and relevant variables. Our measure of corruption, CPI, ranges from 0 to 
1 00 with higher scores indicating lower corruption levels. The measure ranges from 
6.9 in Nigeria in 1996 to 100 in Denmark in 1998 and 1999. Moreover, the measure 
of corruption distance ranges from 0 ( e.g., between Argen tina and Bulgaria in 2000) 
to 89 (between Finland and Nigeria in 2001 ). Furthermore, the geographie distance 
ranges from 59 kilometres, between Austria and Slovakia, to 19,772 kilometres 
between Colombia and Indonesia. Same language is a dummy which takes the value 
of 1 if any of the official languages of the acquirer country are the sa me as any of the 
official languages of the target country. Based on this definition, about 9% of the 
country pairs have the same official language. About 24o/o of the pairs have the sa me 
religion. Additionally, more than 39o/o of completed deals have acquirers that are 
more corrupt than the target countries. 
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Table 2.1 
Summary Stati~tics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
M&A Value (US$ million) 76608 107.5807 1502.39 0 205048 
M&A Number 76608 1.01586 7.302513 0 361 
Location-spec[fic.factors 
CPI 71505 56.15231 23.84018 6.9 100 
Population 76608 7.93E+07 2.10E+08 267468 1.36E+09 
GDP (US$ million) 76545 6.91E+11 1.76E+I2 2.75E+08 1.68E+I3 
GDP PC (US$) 76545 19589.77 19526.04 263.288 112028.6 
GDP Growth (%) 76104 3.536706 3.7266 -14.0983 33.73578 
Annual Returns (%) 72387 0.1594779 0.640804 -0.93217 16.59867 
5year Annual Returns (%) 72639 0.2331028 1.028754 -0.39843 19.28414 
Corporate Income Tax (%) 36099 0.2995652 0.077784 0.125 0.567992 
Unemployment Rate(%) 72639 7.603851 4.458533 0.3 27.2 
Disclosure Quality (%) 47880 61.675 12.5129 24 83 
Political Stability 76041 73.69768 12.11612 37 97 
Composite Risk 76041 75.00025 8.865572 41 93.5 
Relationship 
Corruption distance 67506 2.76563 1.956943 0 8.9 
Geographical distance (kilometres) 76608 7237.8 4784.65 59.61723 19772.34 
Common Language 76608 0.0892857 0.285158 0 1 
Common Religion 76608 0.2395833 0.426832 0 
Exchange rate ratio 51370 279.0581 2425.749 4.15E-06 240772.9 
More-corruQt acguirer countr~ 7535 0.3929662 0.4884418 0 1 
Table 2.2 [preview on page 66, see the Table magnification on Appendix A] depicts 
the pairwise correlations matrix of dependent and independent variables. The two 
dependent variables, M&A value and M&A number, do not show a strong correlation 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.5293. Our measure of corruption, CPI, shows 
strong correlations to GDP per capita, political stability and composite risk. However, 
the variable of interest, Corruption Distance does not show any high correlation w!th 
any of the variables. Only the two control variables, Political Stability and Composite 
Risk are highly correlated; therefore, they are not used within a same model. Apart 
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from the aforetnentioned variables, ali other patrwtse correlations between the 
independent variables are not high enough to cause a possible multicollinearity 
problem in the model. 
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2.4.2 Facts About Cross-border M&A 
Mergers and acquisitions are popular around the world. Firms acquire other firms in 
the hope that the value of the merged finn will be more than the sum of the value of 
two firms. Figure 2.1 plots the value (Panel A) and the number (Panel B) of cross-
border mergers over the smnple period. Both panels show similar patterns. The 
number of cross-border tnergers increases throughout the 1990s, drops after the two 
financial crises of 2000 and 2007, and starts to increase aga in as of 2009. M01·eover, 
between 10 to 20 percent of ali the mergers are cross-border. This percentage also 
follows the stock tnarket. lt increases in the 1990s, drops after the stock market crises 
of 2000 and 2007, and increases after 2007. 
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This figure plots the value (Panel A) and the number (Panel B) of cross-border 
mergers in the sample between 1995 and 2013. Bars represent values and numbers in 
a given year while solid lines represent the fraction of value or number of cross-
border mergers on the total (including domestic mergers) value or number of mergers 
in a given year. 
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Table 2.3 portrays the pattern of cross-border and domestic mergers for the country 
pairs in the sample. The columns represent the target countries while rows represent 
acquirers. The diagonal entries are the number of domestic mergers in a country and 
off-diagonal entries are the number of mergers between the corresponding country 
pair. The totals are reported in the right column and bottom row. Since the domestic 
numbers are excluded, the totals report the number of cross-border mergers in the 
corresponding country. The country with the largest number of mergers is the United 
States with 19,922 being acquirers and 13, 126 being targets. 
Physical distance does indeed matter for mergers. For every country, domestic 
mergers outnumber cross-border mergers. Moreover, neighbouring countries have 
more merger activity. For example, Belgium has more mergers with its neighbours 
(Germany, France and the Netherlands) than with the rest of the world (1534 out of 
2888 total mergers). Similarly, Hong Kong has its main merger activity with China 
(996 merges with Chinese companies out of 2829 total mergers). 
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Table 2.3 
Number of Mergers by Country Pair 
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This table presents the number of mergers by country pairs in the sample period. The 
rows represent the country of the acquirer firms and columns represent the country of 
target firms. 
2.4.3 Determinants of the Likelihood of Mergers 
In this section, 1 use a Pro bit model to measure the Iikelihood of M&A decisions. Our 
dependent variable is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if there is at Ieast one 
merger between the country pair and 0 if there are no mergers between the country 
pair. To better analyze the determinants of merger decisions, 1 use 5 models with 
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different sets of variables. 1 have variables of interest, Distance Variables, Target-
specifie variables and cultural variables. Our variables of inter~st are corruption 
distance and corruption of target. Cultural variables are dummies of common 
language and common religion. Distance variables are the absolute difference of the 
variable values of the two countries in a country pair. This variable set is used m 
Model 1 throughout the paper. Target-specifie variables are the variables conceming 
only the target country in the country pair: This variable set is used in Model 2 
throughout the paper. Model 3 uses amix of variables from both Distance and Target-
specifie variables, which have been used before in the literature. To increase the 
observations, 1 delete the 3 variables of disclosure quality, annual retums, and 
corporate income tax in Model 4. 1 add corruption of target in Model 5 to test if 
corruption in the target country also affects the analysis. 
Table 2.4 illustrates the results of Probit estimation. A number of patterns are seen 
that characterize the likelihood of mergers. First, corruption distance is a strong 
determinant of merger decisions. Corruption distance has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient meaning: the likelihood of mergers decreases as corruption 
distance increases. This confirms the notion that firms in a clean country that have no 
experience in dealing with corruption at home prefer to invest in other clean 
countries; and since firms in a corrupt country are familiar with corruption at home, 
they prefer to invest in other similarly corrupt countries. Second, Geographical 
distance clearly matters and has strong significance in ali the models. Countries with 
shorter distances between them hav·e a higher likelihood of mergers. This is in line 
with the gravity literature. Third, the GDP of the countries is also important. GDP 
distance shows a significant and positive coefficient. As the distance between the 
GDPs increases, mergers also increase. This confirms that firms in countries with 
larger GDPs are willing to invest in comparably smaller countries. Finally, cultural 
variables, common language and common religion are significant and positive in ali 
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the models. Countries that share a common language or religion have more merger 
activity. 
Corruption 
distance 
Corruption of 
target 
Geographical 
Distance 
GDP Distance 
GDP Per Capita 
Distance 
GDP Growth 
Distance 
Unemployment 
Rate Distance 
Disclosure 
Quality 
Distance 
Annual Retums 
Distance 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
Distance 
Ave. 5year 
Annual Retums 
Distance 
Political 
Stability 
Distance 
Composite Risk 
Distance 
% ofTrade in 
GDP Distance 
Exchange rate 
ratio 
Table 2.4 
Pro bit analysis of the likelihood of cross-border mergers 
(1) 
-0.28*** 
(-7.84) 
-0.89*** 
(-16.95) 
0.65*** 
(18.82) 
0.06(1.45) 
-0.08* 
( -1.69) 
-0.15*** 
(-3.31) 
-0.1 * 
(-1.65) 
-0.11 
(-1.58) 
-1.66* 
(-1.95) 
-0.19** 
(-2.21) 
-0.05 
(-0.79) 
-0.09* 
(-1.73) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.93) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
(2) (3) 
Variables of interest 
-0.38*** -0.32*** 
(-33.15) (-29.61) 
Distance Variables 
-0.54*** 
(-30.06) 
-0.57*** 
( -32.33) 
0.51 *** 
(31.13) 
-0.2*** 
(-12.95) 
(4) 
-0.07*** 
(-9.35) 
-0.64*** 
(-50.76) 
0.53*** 
(55.02) 
-0.13*** 
(-12.9) 
(5) 
-0.07*** 
(-9.36) 
0.45*** 
(7.69) 
-0.64*** 
( -51.06) 
0.53*** 
(55.09) 
-0.13*** 
(-12.72) 
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{1} {2} {3} {4) {5} 
Targ_et-sp_ecifj_c variables 
GDP 0.55*** 
(23.3) 
GDP Per Capita 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.05*** -0.03 
(4.5) (3.6) (3) ( -1.54) 
GDP Growth 0.06*** 
(2.73) 
Unemployment 0.11 ** 0.01 -0.05* -0.05* 
Rate (2.19) (0.13) (-1.93) (-1.88) 
Disclosure 0.91 *** 1.44*** 
Quality (5.44) (1 0.06) 
Annual Retums -0.02(- -0.02(-
0.43) 0.69) 
Corporate -3.34*** -2.28*** 
lncome Tax ( -8.34) (-6.67) 
Average 5year 0.2*** 0.17*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
Annual Retums (3.61) (3.31) (6.4) (6.67) 
Political 4.96*** 3.86*** 0.92*** 0.37** 
Stability (12.55) (11.27) (5.44) (2) 
Composite Risk -4.42*** -3.65*** 0.68*** 0.6** 
(-8.31) (-8.23) (2.81) (2.48) 
% ofTrade in 0.25***(4. 0.22***(4. -0.1 ***(- -0.12*** 
GDP 34} 31} 4.25} {-4.94} 
Cultural Variables 
Common 1.38*** 1.35*** 1.32*** 1.46*** 1.42*** 
Language (9.46) (22.39) (22.79) (39.28) (38.12) 
Common 0.49*** 0.08* 0.09** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
Religion (4.58) "(1.81) (2.3) (6.36) (6.95) 
Mode/ Summa'2!_ 
Constant -9.49*** -19.41*** -18.06*** -16.89*** -14.13*** 
(-10.37) (-12.67) (-14.51) (-24.36) (-18.53) 
No. 3122 19245 22324 55671 55671 
Observations 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.20 
This table presents estimates of Probit analysis of the likelihood of cross-border mergers. 
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if there was at least one merger in 
a country pair. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, res2ectivel~. 
In Model 1 1 in elude ali the distance variables. Most of the variables show significant 
coefficients. A larger difference in GDP increases the likelihood of mergers. GDP per 
capita distance does not show any significance. Unemployment rate distance is also 
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significant and shows that firms in countries with lower unemployment rates merge 
with firms in countries with higher rates. Annual retums distance and exchange rate 
ratio does not show any significance. 
Model 2 includes ali the target specifie variables. Higher GDP, GDP per capita and 
GDP growth ali increase the likelihood of mergers. Target unemployment rate and 
disclosure quality are also significant and can increase the probability of mergers. 
Annual retums show no significant relation to mergers but average 5 year annual 
retum is positive and significant, which shows that stock market long-run 
performance can affect merger decisions. Political stability and risk of the target also 
influence merger decisions. 
In Model 3, 1 include the variables from both the distance and target-specifie groups, 
which have been recommended by the literature. GDP distance represents the 
difference in GDP of the countries in the country pair. GDP growth distance shows 
the difference in economie prosperity of the countries in the pair. Target GDP per 
capita is a proxy for target country wealth. Disclosure quality, unemployment rate, 
annual retums, corporate income tax, average 5 year annual retums, political stability, 
composite risk and percentage of trades in GDP are the variables that show the 
characteristics of the target country. A quick glanee at Model 3 indicates that ali the 
variables are statistically significant and have the expected sign. 
To increase the number of observations, in Model 4, 1 remove the variables that limit 
the sample size. Thus, target disclosure quality, target corporate income tax rate and 
target annual retums are excluded. The results of Model 4 are similar to those of 
Model 3. Ali the variables are significant with expected signs. 1 have 55,671 country 
pairs and a pseudo R -squared of 20%. 
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1 add target corruption in Model 5 to analyze whether merger decisions are influenced 
by the corruption level of the target country. Although corruption distance strongly 
affects the merger decision, corruption in the target country is also a determinant of 
merger decision. These results mean that firms in cleaner countries are more likely to 
acquire firms in countries with less corruption distancè and lower corruption, but 
firms in corrupt. countries are more likely to target firms in co un tries with less 
corruption distance and higher corruption levels. 
2.4.4 Determinants of Cross-border Merger Activity, Poo led OLS 
1 use a multivariate framework to analyze the determinants of cross-border merger 
activity. Our goal is to investi gate the factors affecting the tendency of firms from one 
country to merge with firms from another country. Our dependent variable is the 
number of mergers that occurred in a particular country pair over the entire sample 
period. Out of the 69,540 country pairs, 1 include only 13,191 pairs with more than 1 
merger over the sample period. Moreover, because of the selection bias in the sample, 
1 calculate inverse Mills ratio for each model in Table 2.4 and 1 include it in the 
corresponding models in Table 2.5 as a control variable. 
Table 2.5 contains estimates of pooled OLS regression of the sample. Model 1 
includes ali the distance variables, Model 2 uses ali the target specifie variables, 
Models 3, 4 and 5 include the variables that are recommended by the literature. To 
gain more observations, limiting variables are deleted in Mode! 4, and finally, 1 add 
target corruption in Model 5. 
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Table 2.5 
Poo led Analysis of the number of cross-border mergers 
{1} {2} {32 {4} {5} 
Variables of interest 
Corruption -0.25*** -0.36*** -0.31 *** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
distance ( -8.98) (-17.51) (-21.14) (-14.79) (-13.66) 
Corruption of 0.52*** 
target { 10.94} 
Distance Variables 
Geographical -0.65*** -0.52*** -0.57*** -0.54*** -0.56*** 
Distance (-14.49) (-19.51) (-27.15) (-23.16) (-24.24) 
GDP Distance 0.66*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 
(16.77) (22.64) (21.05) (22) 
GDP Per Capita -0.03 
Distance (-1.11) 
GDPGrowth -0.1 *** -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
Distance (-3.65) (-15.13) (-14.98) (-15.27) 
Unemployment -0.14*** 
Rate Distance (-5.27) 
Disclosure Quality :..o.o7* 
Distance ( -1.9) 
Annùal Retums -0.14*** 
Distance (-3.16) 
Corporate Income -0.76 
Tax Distance ( -1.55) 
Ave. 5year Annual -0.29*** 
Retums Distance ( -5.96) 
Political Stability -0.02 
Distance (-0.51) 
Composite Risk -0.07* 
Distance (-1.96) 
% ofTrade in -0.18*** 
GDP Distance (-6.94) 
Exchange rate 0.01 
ratio {0.19} 
Targ_ei-Sf!.ecifj_c variables 
GDP 0.49*** 
(15.27) 
GDP Per Capita 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.08*** -0.01 
(4.25) (4.03) (7.44) ( -0.22) 
GDP Growth 0.08*** 
(4.75) 
Unemployment 0.02 -0.05 -0.11*** -0.11*** 
Rate (0.33) (-1.47) (-5.95) -5.97) 
Disclosure Quality 1.1 *** 1.77*** 
(1 0.08) (18.13) 
Annual Retums 0.02 -0.01 
(1.22) {-0.05} 
{12 {22 {32 {42 {52 
Corporate Income -1.42*** -0.63*** 
Tax ( -4.39) (-2.68) 
Average 5year 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
Annual Retums (6.72) (6.06) (4.5) (5.17) 
Political Stability 3.81*** 2.83*** 0.27* -0.32** 
(10.21) (9.79) (1.82) (-2.14) 
Composite Risk -4.33*** -3.63*** 1.01 *** 0.85*** 
( -10.08) (-10.79) (5.27) (4.47) 
% ofTrade in -0.01 -0.07* -0.34*** -0.36*** 
GDP { -0.182 { -1.832 ( -21.92 {-22.982 
Cultural Variables 
Common 1.04*** 1.1 *** 1.03*** 1.2*** 1.19*** 
Language (12.53) (17.9) (21.37) (22.78) (23.38) 
Common Religion 0.13* -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 
(1.83) (-1.29) (0.33) (0.16) ( 1.19) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.82*** 0.75*** 0.81 *** 0.65*** 0.68*** 
{8.662 {1 0.592 {14.792 {12.91) (13.81) 
Mode/ Summary 
Constant -10.72*** -12.23*** -12.9*** -12.38*** -9.55*** 
(-12.08) (-7.53) (-11.14) (-13.97) (-11.11) 
No. Observations 1494 5665 6539 11667 11667 
Rz 0.42 0.29 0.34 0.29 0.30 
This table presents estimates of Poo led OLS analysis of the number of cross-border mergers. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of mergers within a country pair. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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A number of patterns are seen in this table. Corruption distance is strongly significa.nt 
and negative in ali the models. It stays significant even after adding target corruption 
in Model 5. As the distance in corruption increases, 1 observe less mergers occurring 
in the country pair. A closer look at Model 5 reveals that although mergers occur 
between similar countries in terms of corruption, target corruption is also an 
important matter. This can imply that acquirers seek targets in countries that have 
slightly better corruption levels. Geographical distance is also statistically significant 
and negative in ali the models, meaning that country pairs which are located closer to 
each other have a larger number of mergers. The inverse Mills ratio is significant ·in 
ali the models, which confirms sample selection bias in the data. While common 
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language is statistically significant in ali the models, common religion does not show 
any significance. GDP per capita distance and corporate income tax rates are not 
significant in Model 1, but target GDP per capita and target corporate in come tax rate 
are among the determinants of the number of mergers. 
2.4.5 Determinants of Cross-border Merger Activity, Panel Analysis 
To further extend the analysis, 1 use a panel analysis to investigate the effects of 
corruption distance on merger activity in a country pair. Panel regressions claim to 
provide a more robust picture and they control for country and time fixed effects. 
Table 2.6 reports panel analysis estimates. 
Table 2.6 
Panel Analysis of the number of cross-border mergers 
{1} {2} {3} {4} {5} 
Variables o[_ interest 
Corruption distance -0.08* -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.07*** -0.07*** (-1.92) (-4.78) (-6.89) (-7.34) (-7.55) 
Corruption of target 0.3*** {4.33} 
Distance Variables 
Geographical Distance -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.43*** -0.61 *** -0.62*** (-3.97) (-6.64) (-9.58) ( -9.35) (-9.51) 
GDP Distance 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.52*** 0.53*** (4.57) (8.42) (9.18) (9.35) 
GDP Per Capita 0.01 
Distance (0.14) 
. GDP Growth Distance -0.02 -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** ( -0.93) ( -6.2) ( -7.93) ( -8.09) 
Unemployment Rate -0.05** 
Distance (-2.29) 
Disclosure Quality -0.06 
Distance (-0.99) 
Annual Returns Distance -0.04* (-1.9) 
Corporate Income Tax 0.39 
Distance {0.61} 
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{12 {22 {3) {42 {52 
Ave. 5year Annual -0.11** 
Retums Distance ( -2.52) 
Political Stability -0.01 
Distance ( -0.25) 
Composite Risk -0.04* 
Distance ( -1.77) 
% ofTrade in GDP -0.02 
Distance ( -0.58) 
Exchange rate ratio 0.01 {0.1} 
Targ_et-seeci!J.c variables 
GDP 0.36*** (6.39) 
GDP Per Capita 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.12*** (6.21) (6.55) (12.95) (7.62) 
GDP Growth 0.08*** (7.83) 
Unemployment Rate -0.11** -0.14*** -0.1*** -0.1 *** (-2.53) (-3.71) ( -4.12) ( -4.14) 
Disclosure Quality 0.52*** 1*** (2.7) (5.37) 
Annual Retums -0.01 -0.02 (-0.43) (-0.94) 
Corporate Income Tax -0.68* -0.44 (-1. 7) ( -1.31) 
Average 5year Annual 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.04*** 0.04*'~* 
Retums (3.3) (3.83) (4.55) (4.77) 
Political Stability 1.89*** 1.6*** 0.58*** 0.23 (3.91) (4.35) (3.25) ( 1.38) 
Composite Risk -2.87*** -2.19*** 0.39* 0.32 (-5.62) (-5.29) (1.77) (1.47) 
% ofTrade in GDP 0.18** 0.15** -0.15*** -0.16*** {2.49} {2.31} {-4.88} {-5.19} 
Cultural Variables 
Common Language 0.81*** 0.98*** 1.04*** 1.44*** 1.43*** ( 4.16) (6.71) (8.23) (9.45) (9.65) 
Common Religion -0.07 0.01 0.02 0.12*** 0.13*** (-0.54) (0.04) (0.33) (2.62) (2.84) 
Invers Mills Ratio 0.11 0.34*** 0.51 *** 0.92*** 0.94*** {0.572 (2.95} (5.3) (7.35} {7 51} 
Mode/ Summarl!._ 
Constant -6.23*** -7.13*** -10.34*** -15.04*** -13.32*** (-3.39) (-3.25) (-5.78) (-7.58) (-7.63) 
No. Observations 1494 5665 6539 11667 11667 
R2 0.39 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.27 
This table presents estimates of Panel analysis of the number of cross-border mergers. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the number of mergers within a country pair. Heteroskedasticity-corrected 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. Country and time 
fixed effects are included. ***• **• and* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, anà 10% levels, 
resQectivel~. 
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In Table 2.6, 1 follow the models of previous tables. Model 1 includes distance 
variables, Model 2 uses target specifie variables, Model 3 uses variables commonly 
used in the literature, Model 4 excludes the variables that limit the number of 
observations, and finally Model 5 adds target corruption. 
The results are similar to those of Table 2.5. Corruption distance is negative and 
strongly significant for ali the models even when 1 add target corruption in Model 5. 
Firms in countries with similar levels of corruption have a higher number of mergers 
than firms in countries with a high corruption distance. Moreover, targ~t corruption is 
also a strong determinant of the number of mergers, meaning that firms prefer to 
acquire other firms in similar but slightly less corrupt countries than their own. 
Geographical distance alsq significantly affects the number of mergers. The greater 
the distance between country pairs, the fewer number of mergers. The inverse Mills 
ratio is statistically significant for most of the models, which confirms the sample 
selection bias in the dataset. GDP per capita distance, corporate in come tax rates, and 
disclosure quality difference are not significant in Model 1, but target GDP per capita, 
target corporate income tax rate, and target disclosure quality are among the 
determinants of the number of mergers. These results imply that for acquirers, target 
GDP per capita, income tax, and disclosure quality are more important than their 
home country measures. Target average 5 year annual returns are significant, whereas 
target annual returns do not show any significance in ali the models. This result 
confirms the notion that mergers are a long-term decision and acquirers take into 
account the long-run stock market returns of the target country rather than the short-
time returns. Common language shows significance in ali the models; however, 
common religion is not significant in sorne of the models. 
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2.4.6 Determinants of Cross-border Merger Value, Panel Analysis 
Table 2. 7 reports the panel analysis of determinants of merger values in US dollars. 
Corruption distance is a ~trong determinant of merger value. Not only does corruption 
distance affect the number of mergers between country pairs, but it also has an impact 
on the value of mergers in tne pair. Even after adding target corruption (Model 5), 
corruption distance stays significant and negative. Target corruption also affects 
merger value in the sense that firms prefer to merge with other firms in countries with 
similar but slightly lower corruption levels .. 
Table 2.7 
Panel Analysis of the value of cross-border mergers 
{1} {2} (3) (4} {5) 
Variables o[_interest 
Corruption distance -0.26** -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
( -2.46) ( -4.68) ( -5.35) ( -5.04) ( -4.84) 
Corruption of target 0.47** 
2.35 
Distance Variables 
Geographical Distance -0.36** -0.52*** -0.57*** -0.71 *** -0.72*** 
(-1.97) (-4.79) (-6.06) ( -6.9) ( -6.83) 
GDP Distance 0.6*** 0.59*** 0.71*** 0.71 *** 
(3.41) (6.07) (7.63) (7.56) 
GDP Per Capita -0.08 
Distance (-1.27) 
GDP Growth Distance -0.11 * .-0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
(-1.74) (-3.81) (-4.69) (-4.64) 
Unemployment Rate -0.1 
Distance ( -1.24) 
Disclosure Quality -0.11 
Distance (-0.76) 
Annual Retums Distance -0.1 * 
( -1.92) 
Corporate Incarne Tax 1.01 
Distance (0.61) 
Ave. 5year Annual -0.28 
Retums Distance ( -0.87) 
Political Stability 0.09 
Distance (0.98) 
Com2osite Risk -0.07 
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{1} {2} {3} {4} {5} 
Distance (-0.66) 
% ofTrade in GDP -0.02 
Distance (-0.13) 
Exchange rate ratio 0.01 
1.47 
Targ_et-s[!_ecitJ..c variables 
GDP 0.65*** 
(5.42) 
GDP Per Capita 0.39*** 0.27** 0.39*** 0.32*** 
(2.86) (2.3) (8.91) (5.94) 
GDP Growth 0.14*** 
(3.23) 
Unemployment Rate -0.25** -0.38*** -0.12 -0.12 
(-1.96) (-3.22) (-1.59) ( -1.59) 
Disclosure Quality 1.39*** 1.92*** 
(2.94) (4.26) 
Annual Retums 0.01 -0.03 
(0.07) (-0.36) 
Corporate Income Tax -2.68*** -1.12 
(-2.57) (-1.24) 
Average 5year Annual 0.3* 0.24 0.07*** 0.08*** 
Retums (1.8) (1.53) (3.1) (3.2) 
Political Stability 5.82*** 3.51 *** 0.66 0.11 
(4.53) (3.45) ( 1.15) (0.18) 
Composite Risk -7.21*** -4.28*** 0.51 0.4 
(-5.23) (-3.94) (0.71) (0.55) 
% ofTrade in GDP 0.1 -0.03 -0.48*** -0.5*** 
0.5} {-0.14) { -6.61} {-6.72} 
Cultural Variables 
Common Language 0.96*** 0.95*** 0.93*** 1.48*** 1.45*** 
(2.75) (3.74) (4.15) (6.34) (6.28) 
Common Religion -0.27 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.15 
(-0.97) (0.36) (0.79) ( 1.28) (1.42) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.46 0.84*** 0.89*** 1.18*** 1.18*** 
(1.05) (3.08) (3.83) (5.4) (5.35) 
Mode! Summary 
Constant 5.8 1.48 -0.08 -3.65 -0.81 
(1.43) (0.26) (-0.02) (-0.98) ( -0.23) 
No. Observations 1143 3921 4461 7665 7665 
R2 0.23 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.15 
This table presents estimates of Panel analysis of cross-border mergers. The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of the value of mergers within a country pair. Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics 
are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, resEectivel~. 
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Distance variables do not show statistical significance (Model 1 ), whereas target 
specifie variables are mostly significant. Target unemployment rate is not significant 
in Models 4 and 5; however, it is one of the strongest dete~inants of the merger 
activity (Table 2.6, Models 4 and 5). In cultural variables, only common language 
shows statistical significance. This indicates that speaking a common language not 
only increases the number of mergers in a country pair (Table 2.6) but also increases 
merger value. The inverse Mills ratio is also significant showing the sample selection 
bias of the dataset. 
2.4.7 Determinants of Cross-border Merger Activity, Clean or Corrupt Acquirers 
To further investigate the effects of corruption distance on merger activity and to 
better understand the behaviour of the investeors, 1 divide the sample into two 
subsamples: country pairs which the acquirer' s country has a better corruption lev el 
than that of the target country (cleaner acquirer), and country pairs which the 
acquirer's country is more corrupt than the target's country (corrupt acquirer)-. 1 
reproduce the Models 4 and 5 of Table 2.6 for each subsample. The aim of this 
analysis is find how clean and corrupt acquirers react to corruption distance and also 
to corruption in the target country. Since clean acquirers are corruption-averse and 
corrupt acquirers prefer corrupt countries, it is expected that target corruption should 
be more important for clean acquirers than the corrupt acquirers. However, corruption 
distance should be important for both clean and corrupt acquirers. 
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Table 2.8 
Clean vs. corrupt countries 
( 4, 1) C1eaner ( 4,2) Corrupt (5,1) Cleaner (5,2) Corrupt 
AC AC AC AC 
Variables o[_interest 
Corruption distance -0.03* -0.13*** 0.01 -0.15*** 
(-1.83) (-10.12) (0.59) ( -11.19) 
Corruption oftarget 0.63*** 0.95*** 
(7.55) (8.49) 
Distance Variables 
Geographical Distance -0:62*** -0.5*** -0.62*** -0.52*** 
(-8.59) (-5.74) ( -8.48) (-6.11) 
GDP Distance 0.53*** 0.46*** 0.52*** 0.46*** 
(8.42) (5.86) (8.23) (6.1) 
GDP Growth Distance -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08*** 
( -6.452 (-5.19) (-6.21) {-5.272 
Target-sp_ecifj_c variables 
GDP Per Capita 0.21 *** 0.23*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 
( 12.96) (9.41) (6.75) (4.07) 
Unemployment Rate -0.1 *** -0.09** -0.1 *** -0.11*** 
(-3.63) (-2.28) (-3.68) ( -2.94) 
Average 5year Annual 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 
Retums (3.6) (4.22) (3.77) (4.23) 
Political Stability 0.61 *** 1.51*** -0.04 0.62** 
(2.99) (5.3) ( -0.2) (2.2) 
Composite Risk 0.75*** -0.67* 0.69*** -0.99*** 
(2.9) (-1.78) (2.7) (-2.66) 
% of Trade in GDP -0.22*** -0.06 -0.24*** -0.1 ** 
{-5.312 { -1.46} { -5.74) {-2.35) 
Cultural Variables 
Common Language 1.41*** 1.39*** 1.36*** 1.35*** 
(8.48) (6.86) (8.29) (7.05) 
Common Religion 0.11 * 0.08 0.13** 0.1 
(1.86) (1.17) (2.26) (1.52) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.9*** 0.78*** 0.88*** 0.8*** 
(6.55) (4.48) (6.35) (4.72) 
Mode/ Summary 
Constant -16.93*** -14.32*** -13.81*** -9.44*** 
(-7.77) (-5.09) (-7.15) ( -3.7) 
No. Observations 6892 4775 6892 4775 
R2 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.32 
This table presents estimates of poo led analysis of cross-border mergers. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the number of mergers within a country pair. Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are 
in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. ***, **,and* denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, res_Qectivel~. 
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Table 2.8 reports the panel analysis of determinants of number of mergers for country 
pairs with cleaner acquirers than targets (Models 4.1 and 5.1) and cleaner targets than 
acquirers (Models 4.2 and 5.3). The results are interesting. Corruption distance is less 
significant for cleaner acquirers than corrupt acquirers (Models 4.1 and 4.2). Distance 
in corruption is not a very important issue for the acquirers from cleaner countries; 
however, corruption distance is more important for acquirers from corrupt countries. 
A cl oser look at Model 5.1 reveals an interesting fact. Adding target corruption to the 
regression analysis makes the corruption distance totally insignificant. Conversely, 
adding target corruption in Model 5.2 does not affect ~he significance of corruption 
distance. This means that acquirers from cleaner countries only take target corruption 
into consideration, but not corruption distance, whereas acquirers from corrupt 
countries consider both corruption distance and target corruption. This result 
confirms the notion that acquirers from corrupt countries tend to merge with firms in 
slightly less corrupt countries. 
Geographical distance also counts for both corrupt and clean acquirers. Ali the other 
control variables are significant and have the expected signs except common religion. 
Since 1 have sample selection bias in the data, the inverse Mills ratio is significant. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper makes a systematic attempt to study the effect of corruption distance on 
M&A decisions and activity. Corruption distance is defined as the absolute difference 
between the corruption index of the acquirer and the target in each country pair. First 
1 analyze the effects of corruption distance on M&A decision making by using a 
Probit model, and then 1 use a multivarü~.te regression framework and panel analysis 
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to investigate the propensity of firms from one country to acquire firms from another 
country. 
1 found that corruption distance impacts merger decisions, the number of mergers, 
and the value of mergers in a country pair. Firms in countries that experience 
corruption at home tend to merge with firms in a country with similar levels 
corruption. 1 also found that acquirers in more corrupt countries tend to merge with 
firms in countries with slightly lower corruption levels than theirs. Geographical 
distance between the countries also affects the decision, number and value of 
mergers. Countries with a same official language also have a higher number of 
mergers between them. Moreover, acquirers focus on the long-term stock market 
retums of the target country rather than the actual retums. 
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Variable Name 
Variables o[interest: 
Corruption distance 
Target corruption 
Distance Variables: 
Geographical distance 
GDP distance 
GDP per capita 
distance 
GDP growth distance 
Unemployment rate 
distance 
Disclosure quality 
distance 
Corporate tax income 
rate distance 
Annual returns 
distance 
Average 5 year an nuai 
returns distance 
Political stability 
distance 
APPENDIX 2.1 
Definition and Source 
The absolute difference between the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of the acquirer 
and the target in a country pair. The Corruption Perceptions Index (êPI) is the index 
produced annually by Transparency International. Transparency International uses a 
definition of corruption similar to ours: "the misuse of public power for private benefit." 
The index assigns a score, ranging from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt), to each 
country for each year. As of 2013, Transparency 1 nternational decided to present the index 
ranging from 0 to 100. For simplicity, the index is divided by 10 for 2012 and 2013. 
Source: Transparency International, various years. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index of the target. The index assigns a score, ranging from 0 
(most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt), to each country for each year. As of 2013, 
Transparency International decided to present the index ranging from 0 to 100. For 
simplicity, the index is divided by 10 for 2012 and 2013. Source: Transparency 
International, various years. 
The logarithm of great circle distance between the capitals of countries in a country pair in 
kilometres. Source: CEP II (Research and expertise on the world economy, retrieved from 
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp?id=6). 
The"logarithm of the absolute difference in annual GDP in 2010 US dollar values of 
countries in a country pair. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
The logarithm of the absolute difference in annual GDP per capita in 2010 US dollar 
values of countries in a country pair. Source: World Bank, World Development lndicators. 
The absolute difference in annual GDP growth of countries in a country pair. Source: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
The absolute difference between the unemployment rates of the acquirer and the target in a 
country pair. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
The absolute difference in the index created by the Centre for International Financial 
Analysis and Research to rate the quality of 1990 annual reports on their disclosure of 
accounting information. Source: La Porta et. al. (1997, 1998). 
The absolute difference in income tax rates of the countries in each country pair. Source: 
OECD. 
The absolute difference in annual stock market returns. The monthly returns are calculated 
from the market index of each country and are annualized to calculate the annual returns. 
Source: Bloomberg. 
The preceding five-year average of the absolute difference in the annual stock market 
returns of countries in each country pair. The monthly returns are calculated from the 
market index of each country and are annualized to calculate the annual returns. Source: 
Bloomberg. 
The absolute difference in political risk ratings in each country pair. The political risk 
rating is a means of assessing the political stability of a country on a comparable basis with 
other countries by assessing risk points for each of the component factors of government 
stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internai conflict, externat conflict, 
Variable Name 
Composite risk 
distance 
Percentage of trades 
in GDP distance 
Exchange rate ratio 
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Definition and Source 
corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnie tensions, 
democratie accountability, and bureaucracy quality. Risk ratings range from a high of 100 
(Jeast risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk). Source: International Country Risk Guides. 
The absolute difference in composite risk ratings of the countries in each country pair. It 
consists of composite political, financial, and economie risk rating for a country. It ranges 
from very high risk (0) to very low risk ( 1 00). The higher the points, the lower the risk. 
Source: International Country Risk Guides. 
The absolute distance between the percentages of trades in GDP of the companies in each 
country pair. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
The exchange rate between the currencies of the two countries in each pair. Source: World 
Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Target-specifie variables: 
GDP The logarithm of the annual GDP in 2010 US dollar values of target country. Source: 
GDP per capita 
GDP growth 
Unemployment rate 
Disclosure quality 
Corporate income tax 
rate 
Annual returns 
Average 5 year annual 
returns 
Political stability 
Composite risk · 
Percentage of trades 
ofGDP 
Cultural variables: 
Common language 
Common religion 
World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
The logarithm of the annual GDP per capita in 2010 US dollar values of target country. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. __ 
The annual GDP growth rate oftarget country. Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
The unemployment rate of the target country. Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
The index created by the Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research to rate 
the quality of 1990 annual reports on their disclosure of accounting information. Source: 
La Porta et. al. (1997, 1998). 
The income tax rate of the target country. Source: OECD. 
The annual stock market returns. The monthly returns are calculated from the market index 
of each country and are annualized to calculate the annual returns. Source: Bloomberg. 
The preceding five-year average of the annual stock market returns of the target country. 
The monthly returns are calculated from the market index of each country and are 
annualized to calculate the annual returns. Source: Bloomberg. 
The political risk ratings in the target country. Source: International Country Risk Guides. 
The composite risk ratings of the target country. Source: International Country R1sk 
Guides. 
The percentage of trades in GDP of the target company. Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
Dummy variable that takes the number 1 if any of the official languages of the acquirer are 
the same as any of the official languages of the target. Source: CEPII (Research and 
expertise on the world economy, retrieved from 
http:/ /www .ce pi i. fr/CE PI 1/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp?id=6). 
Dummy variables that take the number 1 if any of the official religions of the acquirer are 
the same as any of the official religions of the target. Source: CEPII (Research and 
expertise on the world economy, retrieved from 
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp?id=6). 
ARTICLE III 
MEDIA CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS AND US FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
ABSTRACT 
Media play an important role in shaping people's beliefs and ideas. More specifically, 
media have a great influence on what we think about foreign countries. The mass 
media influence the way a country's citizens view the people and governments of 
other countries. Ail types of stories about foreign countries are covered in the media. 
Iilvestors looking to invest abroad certainly pay attention to what is reported in the 
media about corruption in other countries. Since corruption plays a buge role in 
investment location decisions, this paper investigates the role of US media corruption 
perceptions on US foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows. 1 find that an abundance 
of corruption stories about a specifie country can demotivate investors and reduce the 
amount of foreign direct investment outflows to that country. 
Keywords: Corruption, Media, Foreign direct investment, investment 
JEL:· D73, G 11, G 14. 
3.1 Introduction 
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H Whoever contrais the media, contrais the mi nd. " 
Jim Morrison, American poet, songwriter, and singer. 
Media play an important role in shaping people's beliefs and ideas. More specifically, 
media have a great influence on what we think about foreign countries. Although 
tourism has grown rapidly in the last few decades, and people visit other countries 
more often, they usually depend on media stories to get information about other 
~ 
nations. Kunczik ( 1997) supports this notion, stating th at "the mass media influence 
the way a country's people form their image~ of the people and govemments of other 
countries, because it · is the mass media that disseminate the greater part of the 
information about foreign countries" (p. 7). Media cover ali types of stories about 
foreign countries. Investors willing to invest abroad certainly pay attention to what 
the media are reporting about foreign countries. Since corruption plays a huge roleïn 
investment ·location decisions, this paper investigates the role of US media on US 
foreign direct investment outflows. 1 construct two media-related variables to gauge 
the perceptions of the US media on countries' corruption: Media Corruption 
Perceptions of ali US media and Media Corruption Perceptions of The Wall Street 
Journal. Both variables are the ratio of the number of stories that co ver corruption in 
a specifie country to the number of stories that cover trades in that country for each 
year. Using a panel of 46 countries spanning from 2000 to 2015, 1 fi nd that the media 
have a huge role to play on investment location decisions. Higher Media Corruption 
Perceptions about a country can lead to lower US foreign direct investment outflows 
to that country, even after introducing the Corruption Perceptions Index in the 
regressions. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 1 review the literature and outline the 
analytical framework in more detail. ln Section 3, 1 construct the data and present the 
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methodology. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes the paper with a discussion of the most important implications. 
3.2 Litera ture Review 
In modern economies and societies, the availability of information is central to better 
decision-making by consumers and investors. Nearly ali of that information is 
provided by the media including newspapers, television, and radio, which collect 
information and make it available to the public. Media are responsible for shaping the 
thoughts and the opinions about almost everything, from new fashion trends to our 
understanding of other countries' politics. The power of the media is so strong that 
they can distort and manipulate information to entrench incumbent politicians, 
preclude investors from making informed decisions, and ultimately undermine the 
markets (Djankov et al., 2003). They can also have an effect on both our conscious 
and subconscious. When reading, watching or listening to the media, we are 
bombarded by information. Even if we are not actively paying attention, this 
information is processed (both consciously and unconsciously) and over time, these 
images, sounds and ideas build patterns in our subconscious and profoundly shape the 
way we think about health, success, relationships, other countries, and many other 
things (Porter, 2004). 
The first to discuss the importance of the media in shaping our thoughts is Sen 
(1984), who explains why India has not experienced any major famines in the post-
Independence era. He observes that newspapers play an important part in making acts 
known and forcing catastrophes to be faced. In contrast, the lack of free media has 
been pointed to as a reason behind why China experienced a major famine between 
195 8 and 1961. As Sen (1984) clearly states, the media increases the sensitivity of 
people towards certain issues. When natural disasters strike, active mass media 
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increase the ability of citizens to monitor how much effort their representatives have 
put into protecting the vulnerable. Besley & Burgess (2002) test Sen's proposition 
empirically. Using data compiled across Indian states, they find that free media 
increase govemment responsiveness to natural shocks because media have the ability 
to make an issue important to the people. 
Djankov et al. (2003) also build on Sen's work, analyzing the ownership structure of 
media and find that countries with greater state ownership of the media have lower 
life expectancy, a greater infant mortality rate, and less access to sanitation and health 
system responsiveness. The World Development Report 2002, Building Institutions 
for Markets, dedicated a chapter to the importance of media and development. The 
role of media has been studied in terms of its impact on govemment transparency and 
accountability (Stiglitz 2002), solving the principal ( citizens)-agent (govemment) 
problem (Besley and Burgess, 2001; Besley et al., 2002), public po licy (Spitzer 
1993), and corporate govemance (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). Additionally, many case 
studies have analyzed the importance of the media industry in specifie countries ( e.g., 
Gross, 1996; O'Neil, 1997; McAnany, 1980; Paletz et al., 1995; Lent, 1980). These 
studies provide evidence suggesting that media can be a powerful force for economie 
development, building sustainable societies, and social progress. 
Corruption, on the other band, is one of humanity's most ancient problems. It is 
generally defined as the misuse of public power for private gains. Corruption is 
widely seen as one of the foremost problems in developing countries ( e.g., Bardhan, 
1997). Common sense leads us to view corruption as an impediment to growth, 
development and investment. The literature that investigates the consequences of 
corruption posits that a high level of corruption is associated with slow economie 
growth and low investment. These hypotheses are supported by empirical studies. In 
a seminal paper, Mauro ( 1995) reports empirical evidence for a negative correlation 
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between corruption and the ratio of inward investment to gross domestic product 
(GDP), as weil as economie growth, in a cross-section of countries. Several 
consequent studies broaden his results and sorne focus on the effects of host country 
corruption on foreign direct investment and find the deterrent role of corruption on 
inward FDI (Hines, 1995; Henisz, 2000; Wei, 2000; Habib and Zurawicki, 2001, 
2002). 
FDI is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and retlecting a 
long-term interest and control of a resident entity in one economy other than that of 
the investor. Since FDI boosts economie growth and development through 
technology transfers and spillovers, many countries have long-term policies to attract 
investors. Grosse and Trevino (1996) and Chen and Chen (1998) classify the 
determinants of FDI into three categories: (1) firm-specific factors, (2) location-
specifie factors, and (3) measures of the relationship between the source and host 
countries. Location factors such as market size, borrowing costs, unit labour costs, 
and institutional and political stability are critical for the firm's investment decision. 
Corruption is determined by a country's institutional and political environment; thus 
high levels of corruption reduce locational attractiveness and have a negative impact 
on investors' decision to invest. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) state that "a corrupt 
economy does not provide open and equal market access to ali competitors. Priee and 
quality become less important than access, since bribery takes place in secret. 
Payments to the host country officiais do not have a market value and, bence, raise 
the cost of goods when compared to a competitive market. This can be a major 
disincentive for foreign investors" (p. 293). Host country corruption also raises the 
cost of a firm's foreign investment, since (1) firms are expected to pay bribes. Wei 
(2000a) suggests that severe corruption has an effect similar to increasing the host 
country tax rate; (2) they are engaged in resource-wasting, rent-seeking activities 
(Murphy et al., 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993); and (3) they have to accept 
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additional contract-related risks, because corruption contracts are not enforceable in 
courts (Boycko et al., 1995). Likewise, Javorcik and Wei (2009) investigate the 
effects of host country corruption on FDI inflows and show that corruption increases 
the advantages of having a local partner to navigate bureaucratie issues. However, 
these advantages come at the cost of reducing the effective protection of a 
multinational firm's intangible assets. Also, corruption reduces the productivity of 
public inputs (e.g., infrastructure) which, in turn, decreases a country's locational 
attractiveness (Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackermann, 1999; Lambsdorff, 2003). 
Therefore, corruption in the host country increases the cost of entry and acts as a 
barrier, reducing firm profits and therefore lowering a firm 's incentives to invest in 
the corrupt country. 
There is a consensus on the detrimental effects of corruption on FDI in the literature. 
Hines (1995) finds that corruption significantly reduces inward FDI. Drabek and 
Payne (2002) investigate the effect of non-transparency, i.e., corruption, on FDI. 
They report that non-transparency negatively impacts FDI. Wei (2000a) finds that 
corruption has a significant negative effect on FDI, using data of the 1990s from 12 
source countries to 45 host countries. Brada et al. (20 12) study the effects of home 
and host country corruption on inward FDI flows and find that corrupt host countries 
are less likely to receive FDI inflows than less corrupt on es. Math ur and Singh (20 13) 
find quite convincingly that corruption does play a big role in investors' decision of 
where to invest; the more corrupt a country is perceived to be, the less the flows of 
FDI to that country. Mudambi et al. (2013) also find that higher levels of corruption 
are associated with lower levels of FDI in a panel of 55 countries from 1985 to 2000. 
In another paper, Delgado et al. (2014) investigate the impact of corruption on the 
. effectiveness of FDI on growth and find that corruption significantly reduces the 
effectiveness ofFDI on growth. 
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US investors are corruption-averse. The US was the first industrial country to address 
the issue of corruption and bribery by implementing the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act 
(FCPA) in 1997. The 1999 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officiais in International Business Transactions made it even harder for US 
investors to engage in corrupt transactions. Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) analyzes the 
effectiveness of laws against corruption and bribery in inducing foreign investors to 
reduce their investments in corrupt countries. He emphasizes the role of the FCP A 
and OECD convention in binding US investors and shows the high sensitivity of US 
investors to host country corruption. He argues that US foreign direct investment to 
corrupt countries has reduced drastically following the implementation of the FCP A 
and OECD convention. ln a seminal paper, Click (2005) innovatively isolates the 
political risk, which in eludes the measure of corruption, from the total risks of MN Cs. 
He uses US FDI data in 59 countries and finds that political risk in the host country 
reduces its location attractiveness for US FDI. Sanyal and Samanta (2008) also 
examined US FDI outflows with respect to the level of corruption in 42 host countries 
over a five-year period. Their analysis indicates that US firms are less likely to invest 
in countries where bribery, as measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), is 
widespread. Oseghale and Nwachukwu (20 1 0) use six indicators to construct a 
measure of the quality of institutions in the host country. Wh ile corruption is one of 
the six indicators, they find that the quality of the host country's institutions has a 
statistically significant and negative effect on outward FDI decisions by US 
multinationals. Bekaert et al. (20 14) used corruption to construct the ir political risk 
index and identify political risk, which includes corruption, has a negative effect on 
USFDI. 
There are numerous daily joumals and newspapers that cover many stories about 
corruption in the US (e.g., The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Chicago 
Tribune, etc.). These newspapers are read by many CE Os and the ir consultants, 
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which can affect their perceptions of corruption in a foreign country and consequently 
the ir investment decisions. The media have the power to affect managers' judgment 
both consciously and unconsciously. By the very nature of mass media ( coliecting 
and disseminating information to people), it is probable that unconsciously (or 
consciously), managers are reluctant to invest in countries that are portrayed in the 
media as being corrupt. Our core hypothesis is as foliows: The media are an 
important factor in managers' investment decision-making. 1 construct media 
corruption perceptions of a country by counting the number of articles containing 
news about that country's corruption in a given year. Then, by utilizing a panel 
regression model, 1 investigate a possible relationship between media corruption 
perceptions and US outward FDI towatds that country. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
The data used in this paper are compiled from several datasets. 1 count the corruption 
news stories from the Factiva database. The FDI data are coiiected from the US 
Bureau of Academie Analysis, which publishes the data related to US foreign direct 
investment. This database provides us with detailed data about the US FDI outtlows 
to ali the countries around the world. Our dataset spans from 2000 to 2015. Table 3.1 
summarizes the definition and sources of ali the variables used in this article. 
Variable Name 
Independent variable: 
Outward FDI 
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Table 3.1 
Definitions and Sources of the Variables 
Definition and Source 
This variable is the natural logarithm of total US foreign direct investment in a given year 
towards a country. The datais collected from the Bureau of Economie Analysis. 
Media Corruption Perceptions (MCP) 
MCP _ali is the ratio of the number of stories in ali US media covering corruption in a country in a year 
divided by the number of stories in ali US media covering news about trades in that country. 
Data are extracted from the Factiva database. 
MCP_WSJ 
Corruption Indices: 
CPI 
ICRG 
Control Variables: 
Population 
Geographical distance 
GDP growth 
GDP per capita growth 
Unemployment rate 
Trade intensity 
Common language 
MCP _ WSJ is the ratio of the number of stories in The Wall Street Journal covering 
corruption in a country in a year divided by the number ofstories in The Wall Street Journal 
covering news about trades in that country. Data are extracted from the Factiva database. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is the index produced annually by Transparency 
International. This index has become a widely used measure of corruption in the literature. lt 
is an aggregated, standardized "poli of polis" of experts, international business people, and 
citizens of each country covered. Every score th us captures the perceptions of both foreigners 
and nationals. of the country being assessed. Transparency International uses a definition of 
corruption similar to ours: "the misuse of public power for private benefit." The index assigns 
a score, ranging from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (!east corrupt), to each country for each year. As 
of 2013, Transparency International decided to present the indexranging from 0 to 100. For 
simplicity, the index is divided by 10 for 2012 and 2013. Source: Transparency International. 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index is an index produced by 
-Political Risk Services. This index is a survey-based indicator, which has been widely used in 
the economies literature. This index is produced monthly. 1 use the average of the months of 
each year as the index for that year. The index scales from 0 to 6. Low scores on the ICRG 
corruption index indicate that "high government officiais are likely to demand special 
payments". Source: Political Risk Services. 
is the natural logarithm of the total population of a country. Source: World Bank and Taiwan 
National Statistics. 
The logarithm of great circle distance between the capitals of countries in a country pair in 
kilometres. Source: CEPII (Research and expertise on the world economy, retrieved from 
http:/ /www .ce pi i. fr/CEPII/en/bdd _ modele/presentation.asp?id=6). 
The annual GDP growth rate of the target country. Source: World Bank Development 
Indicators. 
is the GDP per capita growth in US dollars. Source: World Bank Development Indicators. 
The unemployment rate ofthe target country. Source: World Bank Development lndicators. 
The percentage of trades in GDP of the target country. Source: World Bank Development 
lndicators. 
Oum my variable that takes the number 1 if any of the official languages of the acquirer are 
the same as any of the official languages of the target. Source: CEP II (Research and expertise 
on the world economy, retrieved from 
http:/ /www .ce pi i. fr/CEPII!en/bdd _ modele/presentation.asp?id=6). 
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To analyze the patterns of US FDI outflows, 1 use a multivariate panel regression 
framework. Our goal is to measure the factors affecting the lev el of US FDI outtlows. 
1 have 46 countries in the sample and the dataset spans from 2000 to 2015, th us the 
total number of potential observations is 782 (17 x 46). I limit the report to the 
variables that are correlated with FDI. 
3.3.1.1 Media Corruption Perceptions (MCP) 
Factiva allows us to search its entire database and count the articles that contain a 
specifie word or phrase. The results can be filtered by region, date and language. To 
construct Media Corruption Perceptions (MCP), 1 use two different types of 
variables: the number of corruption stories about each country and the number of 
trade stories about each country. The number of corruption stories about each country 
is the yearly total count of articles that contain words like corruption, bribery, 
embezzlement and graft within three words of the country name: Thus, 1 can isolate 
the articles about corruption in that country for each year. However, media can focus 
on sorne co un tries while ignoring others. For example, in the US media, a case of 
corruption in China will be the subject of numerous articles covering the stories and 
its aftermath, while a comparable scandai in Zimbabwe will not attract the same 
media attention. This special media attention (Media bias) may cause errors to the 
analysis. To correct these errors, 1 use another variable, i.e., the number of trade 
stories about each country, which is the yearly total count of articles in the media that 
contain stories about trades with that country. This can measure the attractiveness of 
the country in the media. Media corruption perceptions (MCP) are simply the ratio of 
the number of corruption stories about each country over the number of trade stories 
about that country for each year. Similar to Tetlock et al. (2008), I require that the 
story mentions the country name at least once within the first 25 words, including the 
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headline, and the country name at least twice within the full news story. Additionally, 
1 require that each news story contains at least 50 words. 
1 construct two MCPs: MCP _ali is the number of corruption stories about each 
country in ali US English media over the number oftrade stories about that country in 
ali US English media for each year, and MCP _ WSJ, which is the number of 
corruption stories about each country in The Wall Street Journal over the number of 
·irade stories about that country in the same journal for each year. 
For MCP _ali, 1 include ali English-language US media sources included in Factiva.'s 
category of major news and business publications plus newswire services. Major 
newspapers and business publications in elude a large number of publications, such as 
USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times, among many others. 
Our counts of media articles include reprints or highly similar articles. This means the 
media coverage variables measure breadth of coverage across multiple media outlets, 
rather than unique news events. Moreover, even if the story principally focuses on 
something other than corruption, the presence of phrases such as "corruption in ... " 
could endorse the existence· of corruption in that country and influence managerial 
decisions. 
1 begin the sample in 2000, since Factiva's news coverage in earlier years is scarcer. 
3.3.2 The Model 
Gravity models are traditionally used to study trade flows from source to host 
economies, but they are also increasingly used to study FDI flows. The gravity model 
is a vigorous method to estimate bilateral trade and FDI flows. The model bas been a 
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great empirical success and presents a geographie view of trade and FDI. In its simple 
form, the model aims to measure trade and the FDI potential of the countries and 
ex plain the 'natural' pattern of bilateral trade and FDI flows. The main components 
of the model are the relative market sizes of the two economies (proxied by 
population) and the geographie distance between their main economie centres. Given 
the gravity variables, the FDI potential between two countries can be estimated. 1 use 
a panel regression model to study the effects of media corruption perceptions on FDI 
and the variable of interest is media corruption perceptions as one of the factors that 
can hinder FDI outflows. The panel model, which is used in the empirical analysis to 
test the hypotheses, is expressed as follows: 
FDii,t = ao + B MCP i,t + y' Xi,t + Àt + ej + Ei,h (1) 
Where FDiï,t is the lev el of US foreign direct investment to country i in year t; MCPi,t 
is the media corruption perceptions of country i in year t; Xi,t is the vector of control 
variables: Corruption Perceptions Index, population, physical distance, GDP growth, 
GDP per capita growth, unemployment rate, trade intensity, and common language; B 
and y are the parameters to be estimated; a0 is the portion of intercept that is common 
to ali countries and years; Àt denotes the year-specific effect common to ali countries; 
ei is the source-country fixed effects; Ei,t is normal error terms with mean zero and 
variance cr2e; i stands for the country (i = 1, ... ,N); and t stands for the year (t = 
1, ... ,T). 
3.3 .3 Control Variables 
To isolate the impact of the media on management's decision to invest in a country, 1 
control for other variables that prior studies have shown to be correlated · with the 
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level of foreign direct investment. The source of the data and the way in which each 
variable is calculated are given in Table 3.1. 
The gravity model (Hamilton and Winters, 1992) predicts that the bigger the masses 
of two countries and the closer the distance, the greater the bilateral international 
flows. There are sorne standard control variables included in the basic gravity models. 
As gravity literature suggests, FDI is positively influenced by the size of the host 
economy because larg~ markets provide a reasonable scope for investment (Habib 
and Zurawiki 2002). Th us, 1 use the log of population as a proxy for country size. On 
the other hand, FDI is negatively affected by the physical distance between the two 
countries. Geographical distance serves as a proxy for transportation and transaction 
costs associated with trade and reflects the resistance to bilateral trade. High GDP 
growth is also an incentive to invest and is a proxy for the change in macroeconomie 
conditions (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). High GDP per capita growth reflects high 
consumption potential in the host country (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), so positively 
affects FDI. Country level unemployment rate has been considered a proxy for labour 
availability (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002) and attractiveness of the host country 
(Godinez and Liu, 20 15). Trade intensity measured as the trade/GDP ratio of the host 
country can stimulate FDI because countries open to international trade provide a 
good platform for global business operations. Moreover, having a common language 
can also facilitate FDI betw~en 2 countries. 1 also include the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CP!) and the International Country Risk Guide (JCRG) as control variables. 
109 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the MCPs, US outward FDI, and other 
control variables. US outward FDI ranges from 29 million dollars to Sri Lanka in 
2000, to 850 million dollars to the Netherlands in 2015. Number of corruption stories 
in ali US media ranges from 0, for sorne European countries, to 806 stories for China 
in 2013. Number of country trade stories in ali US media has a minimum of 150 for 
Zimbabwe in 2001, and a maximum of 109,341 for China in 2010. Moreover, the 
number of corruption stories in The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) ranges from 0 for 
sorne European countries to 153 for China in 2014. In addition, the ntimber of 
country trade stories in the WSJ has a minimum of 4 for Zimbabwe in 2004, and a 
maximum of2,370 for China in 2010. MCP _ali ranges from 0 to 11% and MCP _ WSJ 
ranges from 0 to 57%. 
China, with a population of about 1.3 7 billion, is the most populated country in the 
sample, whereas Ire land, with a population of about 3. 7 million, is the least populated 
country. The closest country to the US is Canada with a distance of 737 km between 
the two capitals, and the farthest country is Indonesia with a distance of 16,3 71 km. 
Same language is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if any of the official languages 
of the acquirer country are the same as any of the official languages of the target 
country. Based on this definition, about 25% of the countries have the same official 
language (English) as the US. 
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Table 3.2 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
US outward FOI (US$ million) 716 43700.6 86844.77 29 858102 
Variables ofinterest 
No. of corruption stories in ali US 748 22.94519 53.63078 0 806 
media 
No. of corruption stories in WSJ 748 3.542781 11.43924 0 153 
No. of country trade stories in ali US 748 13893.49 16024.46 150 109341 
media 
No. of country trade stories in WSJ 748 284.5027 371.7042 4 2370 
MCP _ali 748 0.0034065 0.007915 0 0.1107754 
MCP WSJ 748 0.0190703 0.047292 0 0.5714286 
Corruption indices 
Corruption perception index (Tl) 745 55.61274 24.80127 10 100 
Corruption index (ICRG) 656 3.248349 1.386093 0 6 
Control variables 
Population 745 9.89E+07 2.51E+08 . 3805174 1.37E+09 
Geo-distance 748 8864.192 3868.962 737.0425 16371.12 
GDP growth 745 3.195366 3.730606 -17.66895 33.73578 
GDP per capita growth 735 2.071069 3.541073 -18.87482 30.34224 
·unemployment rate 703 7.399972 4.346269 0.7 27.2 
Trade intensity rate 725 86.07494 73.63405 20.25789 455.2767 
Common language 748 0.2566845 0.4370961 0 
Table 3.3 depicts the pairwise correlations matrix of the dependent variable, variables 
of interest, and control variables. The dependent variable, US outward FDI, does not 
show a strong correlation with any other variables. Number of corruption stories in ali 
US media has a strong correlation with Number of corruption stories in the WSJ, 
which was expected. MCP _ali and MCP _ WSJ do not seem to have a strong pairwise 
correlation. Most of the control variables do not have a strong correlation with the 
other variables, with the exception of the two corruption indices (CPI and ICRG), 
which have a strong correlation and are not used together in a regression. Apart from 
the aforementioned variables, ali other pairwise correlations between the independent 
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variables are not high enough to cause a possible multicollinearity problem In the 
model. 
us No. of 
No. of 
specitic 
country 
Table 3.3 
Correlation matrix 
No. of GDP 
outward corruption No. of in ali specifie per Un- Trade Corruption Corruption 
FDI (US$ in ali US corruption US country MCP 
-
MCP _ Geo- GDP capita employ- intensity perception index Common 
million) media inWSJ media in WSJ ali WSJ Population distance growth growth ment rate rate index (Tl) (ICRG) language 
US outward FDI (US$ million) 
No. of corruption stories in ali US 
media 
No. of corruption stories in WSJ -0.0096 0.9041 
No. of country trade stories in ali 
US media 0.4004 0.3495 0.3281 
No. of country trade stories in 
WSJ 
MCP_all 
MCP_WSJ 
Population 
Geo-distance 
GDP growth 
GDP per capita growth 
Unemployment rate 
Trade intensity rate 
Corruption perception index (Tl) 
Corruption index (ICRG) 
Common language 
0.1712 0.4092 
-0.1445 0.2485 
-0.1325 0.2598 
-0.0513 0.5508 
-0.2139 0.064 
-0.1289 0.1382 
0.4252 -0.1922 
-0.1327 -0.0777 
0.1948 -0.1021 
0.3712 -0.2407 
0.3472 -0.2441 
0.1007 0.0115 
0.4384 0.6971 
0.1203 -0.1925 -0.1312 
0.3031 -0.0838 -0.1072 0.4261 
0.6038 0.3623 0.5481 0.0437 0.1027 
0.1343 -0.0339 0.0532 -0.0302 0.0715 
0.137 -0.0142 0.0678 -0.0219 0.0494 
-0.1653 0.2511 0.0794 -0.3216 -0.2908 
-0.0906 -0.1038 -0.1231 0.0007 -0.0449 
-0.0622 0.0362 -0.0196 -0.1131 -0.0901 
-0.1907 0.2141 0.1287 -0.4121 -0.3615 
-0.2081 0.1787 0.0651 -0.4034 -0.347 
-0.0038 0.1653 0.0119 -0.0222 0.0348 
3.4.2 Facts About the Variables oflnterest 
0.1844 
0.3121 0.2519 
-0.2686 -0.2101 -0.3111 
-0.1466 -0.1108 -0.1189 -0.2057 
-0.1808 0.2696 0.0597 0.2602 -0.2281 
-0.279 -0.0609 -0.2402 0.8125 -0.19 0.3683 
-0.2569 -0.1053 -0.2064 0.7406 -0.1362 0.2243 0.9018 
0.1044 0.3458 0.1718 0.0217 0.0504 0.2876 0.1192 
Figure 3.1 plots the aggregate number of corruption stories in ali US media (marked 
by +) and the aggregate number of corruption stories in the WSJ ( marked by x) over 
the sample period. The number of corruption stories in ali US media stays stable until 
2010, when 1 see a sharp increase until it peaks in 2013 with a total number of 2,174 
US media stories covering corruption in the countries of the sample. In addition, the 
number of corruption stories in the WSJ also foliows the same pattern; it is stable 
un til 2010 and th en it increases sharply in 2015. 
0.0393 
Ali US media 
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This figure plots the aggregate number of corruption stories in ali US media (+) and Wall Street 
Journal (x) in the sample between 2000 and 2015. 
Figure 3.1 Aggregate number of corruption stories in ali US media and in Wall 
Street Journal 
Figure 3.2 plots the aggregate number of country trade stories in ali US media 
(marked by +)and the aggregate number of country trade stories in the WSJ (marked 
by x) over the sample period. The number of country trade stories in ali US media 
has increased throughout the sample period. However, it peaked in 201 O. In contrast 
to the aforementioned trend, the number of country trade stories in the WSJ has 
decreased over the sample period. Interestingly both measures have a peak in 201 O. 
Aggregate number of country trade stories 
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This figure plots the aggregate number of country trade stories in ali US media ( +) and Wall Street 
Journal (x) in the sample between 2000 and 2015. 
Figure 3.2 Aggrégate number of country trade stories in ali US media and in Wall 
Street Journal 
3.4.3 Determinants of Foreign Direct lnvestment, Panel Analysis 
To analyze the effects of media corruption perceptions on US outward foreign direct 
investment, 1 use a multivariate regression framework. Our goal is to investigate how 
media perceptions of a country's corruption can affect the level of US FDI towards 
th at country. Because 1 am interested in the effects of media corruption perceptions 
on FDI and how changes in these perceptions can influence outward FDI, 1 use a 
panel analysis. Our dependent variable is the level of FDI towards receiving country 
and the variables of interest are the MCP ali and MCP WSJ. 1 also use several 
- -
control variables that are suggested by the literature as a determinant of outward FDI. 
Table 3.4 presents random effect panel regression estimates of the determinants of US 
outward FDI as represented by media corruption perceptions (MCP _ali and 
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MCP _ WSJ). The results are revealing. Models 1, 2 and 3 illustrate that MCP _:_ali is a 
strong determinant of US outward FDI. The coefficient of MCP _ali is very 
significant in ali the models and has the expected signs. An increase in the MCP _ali 
(having more stories about corruption in a country) reduces the amount of FOI 
towards that country. ln Model 2, I add the Corruption Perceptions Index as a control 
variable. 1 observe that the coefficient of MCP _ali stays significant even after taking 
into account corruption in the target country. CPI is also strongly significant and the 
positive sign shows that when the index increases (higher values show less 
corruption), 1 observe that US FDI towards that country also increases. In Model 3, I 
use the ICRG as the corruption index. The results are the same as in Model 2. 
MCP _ali stays significant and negative, while ICRG is significant and positive. 
Although the corruption index is a determinant of FDI, the media perception of 
corruption in a country also plays a big role on the amount of US outward FOI 
towards that country. For Model 2, there are 657 observations and R-squared equals 
)19%. 
115 
Table 3.4 
Panel Ana1ysis of the outward US foreign direct investment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables of interest 
MCP Ali -9.304*** -8.217*** -1 0.882*** 
(-3.61) ( -2. 77) ( -4.1) 
MCPWSJ 0.234 -0.03 0.055 
(0.22) (-0.03) (0.05) 
Corruption indices 
CPI 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
(2.6) (2.86) (2.63) 
ICRG 0.14** 0.128* 
(2.04) (1.79) 
Control variables 
Geographical -1.465*** -1.307*** -1.362*** -1.492*** -1.351 *** -1.382*** -1.363*** 
Distance ( -2. 75) (-2.95) (-2.84) (-2.67) ( -2.83) ( -2.74) ( -2.81) 
Population 1.732*** 1.661 *** 1.542*** 1.822*** 1.807*** 1.607*** 1.836*** (5.97) (6.23) (5.87) (6.38) (6.93) (6.23) (6.43) 
GDP Growth -0.048 -0.05 -0.041 -0.045 -0.047 -0.04 -0.045 ( -0.8) (-0.86) (-0.7) (-0.74) (-0.79) ( -0.67) ( -0.79) 
GDP per capita 0.034 0.036 0.029 0.033 0.034 0.03 0.033 
Growth (0.56) (0.61) (0.48) (0.55) (0.58) (0.5) (0.57) 
Unemployment -0.011 -0.005 -0.013 -0.01 -0.004 -0.012 -0.004 
rate (-0.79) ( -0.37) (-0.97) (-0.69) (-0.28) ( -0.9) (-0.27) 
Trade Intensity 0.006** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.006** 0.006*** (2.52) (2.71) (2.24) (2.5) (2.68) (2.25) (2.67) 
Common 0.673 0.446 0.631 0.689 0.469 0.645 0.475 
Language (0.61) (0.48) (0.64) (0.59) (0.47) (0.62) (0.47) 
Constant 5.82 4.191 7.755 4.449 2.036 6.791 1.649 (0.83) (0.66) (1.22) (0.63) (0.32) (1.07) (0.24) 
Observations 660 657 621 660 657 621 657 
R2 5.29% 18.28% 8.67% 4.28% 14.78 6.88% 14.18% 
This table presents random effect estimates of Panel analysis of the US foreign direct investment outtlows. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the amount of US foreign direct investment towards each country. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Table 1. ***, 
**,and* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Models 4, 5 and 6 show MCP _ WSJ as the variable of interest. The variable is not 
significant in any models; however, it has the expected sign. Although The Wall 
Street Journal is an influential source of information for investors, its stories covering 
corruption ali around the world are not powerful enough to solely sway foreign direct 
investment. 
As expected in the gravity models, geographical distance is also statistically 
significant and negative in ali the models, meaning that countries located cl oser to the 
United States receive larger numbers of US FDI. Moreover, population is significant, 
and a larger population attracts more FDI. GDP growth and GDP per capita growth 
are not significant in ali the models, and it seems that investors do not pay attention to 
GDP growth or GDP per capita growth. Unemployment rate is not significant in ail 
the models. Political stability shows a little bit of significance, meaning that investors 
prefer not to invest in countries that are not politically stable. In addition, having a 
common language with the US is not significant. 
3.4.4 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment, Pooled Analysis 
Here I use a multivariate framework to analyze the determinants of US outward FDI 
to a country. Our goal is to investigate the factors affecting the tendency of investors 
to invest in another country. Our dependent variable is the dollar amount of US 
outward FDI to a particular country over the entire sample period. 
Table 3.5 contains estimates of poo led OLS regression of the samp~e. Models 1, · 2 
and 3 include MCP _ali as the variable of intt~rest and in Models 3, 4 and 5 I have 
MCP _ WSJ as the variable of interest. 1 add Corruption Perceptions indices to Models 
2, 3, 5 and 6. In Model 7, I use only the control variables without including the 
variables of interest. 
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Table 3.5 
Poo led Analysis of the outward US foreign direct investment 
{1~ (2~ (3) (4~ (5~ (6) (7) 
Variables of interest 
MCP Ali -83.98*** -46.973*** -60.072*** 
(-4.68) (-4.94) (-5.93) 
MCP WSJ -10.098*** -3.481** -6.564*** 
{ -6.49) (-2.38) { -4.46~ 
Corrup_tion indices 
CPI 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 
(15.35) (15.83) (16.94) 
ICRG 0.595*** 0.68*** 
9.4 9.75) 
Control variables 
Geographical -1.105*** -0.971 *** -1.056*** -1.059*** -0.949*** -1.017*** -0.963*** 
Distance (-11.36) (-10.75) (-9.95) (-1 0.5) (-10.16) (-9.39) (-1 0.22) 
Population 0.514*** 0.965*** 0.808*** 0.513*** 0.998*** 0.845*** 0.992*** 
(11.21) (19.75) (14.36) (10.78) (19.96) (14.53) (19.93) 
GDP Growth -0.609*** -0.095 -0.306*** -0.773*** -0.143* -0.382*** -0.151 * 
(-7.3) (-1.08) (-3.59) (-9.53) ( -1.69) (-4.47) (-1.78) 
GDP per capita 0.54*** 0.052 0.248*** 0.724*** 0.115 0.339*** 0.126 
Growth (6.15) (0.57) (2.78) (8.07) (1.33) (3.81) (1.46) 
Unemployment rate -0.066*** -0.019* -0.042*** -0.064*** -0.013 -0.037*** -0.009 
(-5.52) (-1.93) (-3.73) (-4.93) ( -1.2) (-3.08) (-0.82) 
Trade Intensity 0.01 *** 0.008*** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.008*** 0.01*** 0.008*** 
(9.84) (12.46) (11.86) (9.33) (12.22) (11.76) (12.15) 
Common Language 0.698*** 0.069 0.43*** 0.848*** 0.085 0.492*** 0.055 
(4.97) (0.49) (2.9) (5.83) (0.6) (3.2) (0.4) 
Constant 24.808*** 12.114*** 16.696*** 24.39*** 10.941 *** 15.318*** 1o'.978*** 
(25.55) (9.95) (11.56) (23.81) (8.43) (9.91) (8.38) 
Observations 660 657 621 660 657 621 657 
R2 45.89% 63.70% 54.70% 38.97% 61.07 51.04% 60.66% 
This table presents estimates of Poo1ed OLS analysis of the US foreign direct investment outtlows. The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of the amount of US foreign direcl investment towards each country. Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics 
are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, reseectivel~. 
The results are the same as the panel data analysis. MCP _ali is strongly significant 
and negative, meaning that covering more stories about corruption in a country 
reduces US foreign direct investment to that country. The coefficient of MCP _ali 
stays strongly significant even after adding the corruption indices to the equation in 
Models 2 and 3. This means that although corruption in the target country (measured 
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by the CPI or ICRG) is important for the investors, stories about corruption in that 
country covered by the media have a bigger influence on their decision. Corruption m 
the target country is also a strong and significant determinant of FDI. ln addition, the 
gravity model suggests that geographie distance and population affect the mutual 
investment between two countries. Table 3.5 proves this claim. Both geographical 
distance and population are strongly significant and have the expected signs. GDP 
growth and GDP per capita growth are significant in sorne of the models. 
Unemployment rate is also significant in sorne of the models. Moreover, trade 
intensity shows a strong significance, and common language is significant in sorne 
models. The R -squared varies between 3 8 and 63 percent. And 1 have around 660 
observations for the models. 
3.4.5 Determinants of Foreign Direct lnvestment, Regional Dummy Interactions 
To check the robustness of the results, Table 3.6 includes regional dummy 
interactions with the variablés of interest. 1 have five regional dummies: South 
America, Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa. North America is omitted to 
avoid multicollinearity. Table 3.6 presents the estimates of Pooled OLS analysis of 
US foreign direct investment outflows to specifie regions. The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of the amount of US foreign direct investment towards each country. 
The variables of interest are MCP _ali and MCP _ WSJ. Because 1 include the regional 
dummy interactions, 1 have to interpret the coefficients of the interaction variables 
with respect to the variable of interest. The coefficients of MCP _ali are positive and 
strongly significant in ali the models. However, the coefficients of interaction 
variables are negative and strongly significant for South America, Asia, the Middle 
East and Africa. The coefficients of interaction variables of Asia, the Middle East and 
Africa are smalier than the MCP ali. This means that the overali effect of media 
corruption perceptions is strong, negative and significant in Asia, the Middle East and 
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Africa. The coefficients of MCP _ WSJ are positive and significant for Models 3 and 
4. However, the interaction variables are negative and significant for South America, 
Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The coefficients of these regions are smaller than 
the coefficient of MCP _ WSJ in respective models, which means that overall media 
corruption perceptions have a negative and significant effect on US FOI. The only 
regional dummy interaction variable that shows no significance is the interaction 
variable of Europe. As mentioned earlier, Europe is considered a corruption-free 
region by the media, and there is no corruption coverage in most of the European 
countries in the sample. This is the reason why the coefficient of Europe dummy 
interaction is not significant. Corruption indices stay positive and strongly significant 
in ali models. 
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Table 3.6 
Poo led Analysis of the outward US foreign direct investment, Regional dummy 
interactions 
{1} (2} {3} (4} 
Variables o[_interest 
MCP Ail 232.066*** 137.36*** 
(3.39) (3.01) 
MCP WSJ 42.596*** 35.049*** 
(3.16) {3.51) 
Corru[!_tion indices 
CPI 0.053*** 0.056*** 
(15.41) (15.57) 
ICRG 0.596*** 0.69*** 
{9.65) (1 0.04) 
Regional dummJ::. interactions 
-194.589*** -170.394*** -40.32*** -37.926*** 
South America (-2.87) (-3.67) (-3) (-3.8) 
-112.617 47.268 -18.493 -5.81 
Europe (-1.26) (0.46) ( -1.26) ( -0.45) 
-299.642*** -248.296*** -47.532*** -46.502*** 
Asia (-4.35) (-5.21) (-3.51) (-4.62) 
-300.98*** -207.166*** -38.35*** -25.821 ** 
Middle East (-4.15) (-3.55) (-2.61) ( -2.31) 
-278.753*** -194.246* * * -48.801 *** -41.466*** 
Africa (-4.16} {-4.4} {-3.66} (-4.23) 
Control variables 
Geographical -0.824*** -0.928*** -0.884*** -0.916*** 
Distance (-9.02) ( -8.8) (-8.86) (-8.23) 
Population 1.001 *** 0.851 *** 0.988*** 0.857*** 
(18.29) (13.67) (18.6) (13.74) 
GDP Growth -0.091 -0.29*** -0.161 * -0.405*** 
( -1) (-3.31) ( -1.83) (-4.73) 
GDP per capita 0.049 0.231** 0.14 0.369*** 
Growth (0.53) (2.53) (1.56) (4.12) 
Unemployment rate -0.018 -0.047*** -0.013 -0.043*** 
( -1.64) (-4) (-1.15) (-3.45) 
Trade Intensity 0.008*** 0.01 *** 0.008*** 0.011 *** 
(12.08) (11.99) (11.57) (11.67) 
Common Language 0.145 0.529*** 0.149 0.572*** 
(1.01) (3.47) (1.04) (3.73) 
Constant 9.92*** 14.754*** 10.459*** 14.151 *** 
(7.21) (9.49) (7.43) (8.45) 
Observations 618 621 618 621 
R2 65.37% 55.99% 62.51% 52.71% 
This table presents estimates of Pooled OLS analysis of the US foreign direct investment outtlows to 
specifie regions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the amount of US foreign direct investment 
towards each country. Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions 
are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
res~ectivel~. 
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Table 3.7 includes regional dummy interaction with the variables of interest, but 
omits the MCP _ali and MCP _ WSJ. In Models 1 and 2, I include the regional dummy 
interactions with MCP _ali and in Models 3 and 4 I have the regional dummy 
interactions with MCP WSJ. The results of Table 3.7 further confirm the results. The 
coefficients of interaction dummies in Models 1 and 2 are significant and negative for 
Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In Models 3 and 4, the coefficients for Asia and 
Africa are negative and significant. Moreover, corruption indices stay positive and 
significantly strong in ali the models. The results suggest that media· corruption 
perceptions are a strong determinant of US FDI outtlows. 
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Table 3.7 
Poo led Analysis of the outward US foreign direct investment, Regional dummy 
interactions only 
~12 {22 {32 {42 
Corruption indices 
CPI 0.053*** 0.056*** 
(15.33) (15.43) 
ICRG 0.59*** 0.685*** 
(9.56) (9.92) 
Regional dummy 
interactions 
29.571 -37.085* 1.764 -3.268 
South America (1.2) (-1.93) (0.7) ( -1.34) 
114.457** 181.128** 23.433*** 28.652*** 
Europe (1.97) (2.02) (3.59) (3.37) 
-70.989*** -112.609*** -5.168* -11.599*** 
Asia ( -3.34) (-4.52) ( -1.79) (-4.04) 
-74.53** -73.111 * 3.908 8.919 
Middle East (-2.2) (-1.73) (0.61) (1.54) 
-48.429*** -57.827*** -6.436*** -6.608*** 
Africa ( -4.5) (-5.84) (-5.23) (-4.26) 
Control variables 
Geographical Distance -0.887*** -0.964*** -0.94*** -0.962*** 
(-9.7) (-9.36) (-9.37) (-8.76) 
Population 1.012*** 0.859*** 1.002*** 0.869*** 
(18.44) (13.84) (18.8) (13.93) 
GDP Growth -0.079 -0.281 *** -0.151 * -0.396*** 
(-0.87) (-3.22) (-1.72) ( -4.63) 
GDP per capita Growth 0.034 0.22** 0.127 0.358*** 
(0.36) (2.42) ( 1.42) (4.02) 
Unemployment rate -0.022** -0.049*** -0.017 -0.045*** 
(-2.05) (-4.24) (-1.43) ( -3.67) 
Trade Intensity 0.008*** 0.01 *** 0.008*** 0.011*** 
(12.29) (12.09) (11.8) (11.83) 
Common Language 0.133 0.519*** 0.143 0.564*** 
(0.92) (3.37) (0.98) (3.65) 
Constant 10.376*** 14.982*** 10.778*** 14.398*** 
(7.55) (9.63) (7.61) (8.57) 
Observations 618 621 618 621 
Rz 65% 55.86% 62.08% 52.43% 
This table presents estimates of Poo led OLS analysis of the US foreign direct investment outtlows to 
specifie regions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the amount of US foreign direct 
investment towards each country. Variables MCP _ail and MCP _ WSJ are not used in this table. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The variable definitions are provided in 
Table 1. ***, **,and* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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3.4.6 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment, Percentile Analysis 
In the next robustness test, I conduct the percentile analysis for the determinants of 
US FDI outflows, as shown in Table 3.8. I use lOth, 50th and 90% percentiles, and I 
separately include the two corruption indices in the models. For the 1 oth and 50th 
percentiles, I observe the same results as in the other tables: MCP _ali and·MCP _ WSJ 
are negative and strongly significant; corruption indices have the expected signs and 
are significant and positive. However, for the 90th percentile in Models 3 and 9, I 
observe that a corruption perceptions indice's t-values decrease and even lose its 
significance in Model 12, meaning that in the 90th percentile of media corruption 
perceptions (ali media), news about corruption of a country is more important and 
more significant than the corruption index per se. Model 6 and Model 12 exhibit 
different patterns. In Model 6 in the 90th percentile, MCP _ WSJ loses its significance, 
while CPI remains significant. This can show that the corruption perceptions of only 
one media source is not an important determinant of US FDI outflows in comparison 
to MCP _ali, which represents the corruption perceptions of ali media. However, 
Model 12 contradicts Model 6. The coefficient of ICRG loses its significance while 
MCP _ WSJ stays negative and significant. The contradiction between the two models 
can arise from two things. First, the CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) is widely 
used and trusted in measuring countries' lev el of corruption, whereas the ICRG is less 
known and not as widely used in the cost benefit analysis of investment projects. 
Since the CPI is more trusted by the US industry, it can be a stronger determinant of 
US FDI than MCP WSJ (Model 6). However, the ICRG is less used and therefore 
loses its significance in comparison to MCP _ WSJ in Model 12. Second, the number 
of observations is too smali for both models ( 43 vs. 3 7). Th us, the smali number may 
be causing a sample selection bias, creating contradictory results in the two models. 
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Table 3.8 
Pooled Analysis of the outward US foreign direct investment, Percentile analysis 
{1} (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(lOth (50th (90th (lOth percenti le) (50th (90th 
Eercentile} Eercenti le} Eercentile 1 Eercenti le} Eercentile) 
Variables o[_interest 
MCPAII -49.029*** -44.532*** 
(-4.71) (-4.1) 36.733*** 
(-3.05) 
MCP WSJ -5.901 *** -6.592*** -8.702 
(-4.22) {-4.4) ( -1.53) 
Corruf!.lion indices 
CPI 0.049*** 0.05*** 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.042** 
(13.63) (9.23) (4.03) (11.77) (9.54) (2.57) 
ICRG 
Control variables 
Geographical -0.932*** -0.881 *** -0.952*** -0.805*** -0.777*** -0.792*** 
Distance (-10.05) (-6.39) (-4.29) (-7.09) (-6.06) (-2.76) 
Population 0.885*** 0.946*** 0.883*** 0.665*** 0.743*** 0.831 *** 
(17.03) (13.12) (6.22) (9.99) (9.24) (4.83) 
GDP Growth -0.208** -0.226* -0.208 -0.171 -0.146 -0.496 
(-2.31) (-1.78) (-0.48) (-1.51) (-1.11) ( -1.55) 
GDP per capita 0.173* 0.177 0.215 0.145 0.129 0.459 
Growth (1.87) (1.38) (0.5) ( 1.24) (0.95) ( 1.39) 
Unemployment rate -0.021** -0.016 -0.036 -0.018* -0.021 * -0.038 
(-2.02) (-1.01) (-1.06) (-1.79) (-1.71) (-1.3) 
Trade lntensity 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007** 
(10.56) (8.06) (4.08) (5.69) (4.99) (2.54) 
Common Language 0.092 0.201 -0.157 -0.301 * -0.15 0.35 
(0.63) (0.94) ( -0.25) ( -1.84) (-0.72) (0.72) 
Constant 13.555*** 11.906*** 14.224*** 16.449*** 14.707*** 14.588*** 
(10.85) (6.54) (3.95) (9.46) (7.09) (2.96) 
Observations 563 319 62 307 218 43 
R2 65.77% 65.41% 72.95% 69.17% 70.14% 7~% 
{7} 
(lOth 
{8} 
.(50th 
{9} 
(90th 
{1 01 
(1 oth percenti le) 
{11~ 
(501 
{12~ 
(901 
Eercentile1 Eercentile 1 Eercentile} Eercenti le 1 Eercenti le 1 
Variables of interest 
MCPAII -62.236*** -59.862*** 
(-5.59) (-4.92) 48.175*** 
(-3.69) 
MCP WSJ -9.111*** -10.833*** -13.323** 
{ -5.561 { -4.891 {-2.44} 
Corruf!.lion indices 
CPI 
ICRG 0.575*** 0.539*** 0.386** 0.714*** 0.688*** 0.355 
(8.481 (5.231 {2.1) {7.84} (6.31 {1.62) 
Control variables 
Geographical -0.978*** -0.914*** -1.208*** 0.714*** -0.821 *** -0.661 ** 
Distance (-9.16) (-5.99) (-3.38) (7.84) (-4.64) ( -2.22) 
Population 0.736*** 0.809*** 0.761*** 0.714*** 0.617*** 0.771 *** 
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~7} (8) (9} (1 0) (Il{ ~12) 
(lOth (50th (90th (1 oth percentile) cso1 (90th 
~ercentile} ~ercentile} ~ercentile} ~ercenti le} ~ercenti le 2 
(12.44) (9.18) (5.05) (7.84) (7.12) (3.66) 
GDP Growth -0.402*** -0.446*** -0.452 0.714*** -0.357** -0.617 
(-4.53) (-3.5) ( -1.09) (7.84) (-2.24) (-1.66) 
GDP per capita 0.348*** 0.372*** 0.425 0.714*** 0.334** 0.546 
Growth (3.73) (2.82) (1) (7.84) (2.05) (1.42) 
Unemployment rate -0.044*** -0.042** -0.058 0.714*** -0.045*** -0.056 
(-3.73) (-2.32) ( -1.55) (7.84) (-2.98) (-1.61) 
Trade Intensity 0.009*** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.714*** 0.006*** 0.007** 
(9.93) (7.5) (2.92) (7.84) (4.34) (2.3) 
Common Language 0.419*** 0.471 ** 0.208 0.714*** 0.257 0.828 
(2.69) (2.05) (0.32) (7.84) ( 1.01) (1.66) 
Constant 17.618*** 15.893*** 19.995*** 0.714*** 18.518*** 15.984*** 
(12) (7.03) (5.36) (7.84) (7.87) (2.9) 
Observations 529 297 60 285 196 37 
R2 58.43% 57.60% 63.88% 61.94% 62.07% 69.56% 
3.5 Conclusion 
The media are a powerful tool to shape and form our ideas about almost anything. 
They can change the way 1 think about a foreign country, its people and its situation. 
Media also affect investors who want to invest abroad. They are affected by both the 
news stories about a country's corruption and the abundance of these stories. This 
study analyzes the effect of US media news stories that co ver corruption in a country 
on US foreign direct investment outflows to that country. 1 study the effect of having 
many news stories covering corruption in a specifie country on the volume of US 
foreign direct investment towards that country. 1 construct two variables related to 
news stories: MCP _ali, which is the ratio of the number of stories in ali US media 
covering corruption in a country in a year divided by the number of stories in ali US 
media covering news about trades in that country; and MCP _ WSJ, which is the ratio 
of the number of stories in The Wall Street Journal covering corruption in a country 
in a year divided by the number of stories in The Wall Street Journal covering news 
about trades in that country. 1 use a panel of 46 countries over a 16-year period to test 
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the hypotheses. 1 find that both MCP _ali and MCP _ WSJ are strong determinants of 
US foreign direct investment. Even after introducing corruption indices in the 
regressions, the two media corruption variables stay strong and significant. This 
further confirms the hypotheses that the media have a significant impact on foreign 
investment. 
Our results also confirm previous studies on this subject. Brada et al. (20 12) study the 
effects of host country corruption on inward FDI flows and find that corrupt host 
countries are less likely to receive FDI inflows. Mathur and Singh (2013) find that 
corruption does play a big role in in v es tors' decision of where to in v est, stating that 
corrupt countries receive less flows of FDI. Mudambi et al. (20 13) also find that 
higher levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of FDI. 1 also find that 
corruption gauged by the perception of foreign country corruption by the US media, 
has a negative and significant effect on investment decisions and the amount of FDI 
outflows by the United States. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Corruption is widely viewed as one of the foremost problems in developing countries 
( e.g., Bardhan, 1997). Common sense dictates that corruption be viewed as an 
impediment to growth, development and investment. The literature that investigates 
the consequences of corruption posits that a high level of corruption is associated 
with slow economie growth and low investment. These hypotheses are supported by 
empirical studies. In a seminal paper, Mauro (1995) reports empirical evidence for a 
negative correlation between corruption and the ratio of inward investment, GDP, as 
well as economie growth, in a cross-section of countries. Several consequent studies 
broaden his results and sorne focus on the effects of host country corruption on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and find the deterrent role of corruption on inward 
FDI (Hines, 1995; Henisz, 2000; Wei, 2000; Habib and Zurawicki, 2001, 2002). 
These papers argue that corruption in the host country increases the cost of entering a 
country and thus acts as a market barrier. However, the relationship also goes in the 
other direction: FDI can introduce new norms and pol ici es to the corrupt environment 
and decrease the lev el of corruption. 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A), joint ventures, green-field investments, licensing 
agreements, etc. are all various forms of FDI. Foreign inves.tors have their choice of 
FDI when they want to enter a new economy. Although there are many studies that 
investigate the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment, the literature on the 
effect of corruption on M&A is scarce. As the largest component of foreign diréct 
investment, mergers and acquisitions are expected to be negatively affected by 
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corruption. Weitzel and Bems (2006) are among the few who have examined such a 
relationship and add depth to the understanding of the familiar negative relationship 
between FDI and corruption. They find that higher corruption in the host country is 
associated with lower target premiums. They also show that corruption is a market 
barrier to entry and is a discount on merger synergies. In a separate study, Javorcik 
and Wei (2009) find that corruption in the host country shifts ownership from whole 
ownership to joint ventures, and that investors prefer to form a joint venture rather 
than merge when they want to enter a corrupt country. On the other hand, M&A 
activity, as the most important part of FDI, can lead to a less corrupt environment 
since M&A can introduce new strategies, tactics and policies. 
Essay one investigates the effects of M&A activity on the corruption lev el of the host 
country. Our hypothesis is that cross-border M&A activity can introduce new norms 
and strategies to the target companies. Competition and domestic mergers can help 
the spread of these new norms to the environment, which can lead to a less corrupt 
environment. 1 test this hypothesis on a sample of 50 countries over a 16-year period, 
and 1 empirically find that M&A activity (both domestic and cross-border) can 
decrease a country's level of corruption. 1 utilize different methods to check the 
robustness of the results. 1 use an altemate measure of corruption; 1 di vide the sample 
to regional sub samples; 1 use panel and pooled regressions; and finally 1 use longer 
1 
lags. The results of the robustness tests confirm the hypothesis. 
Essay two studies the effect of corruption distance on the M&A activity between 
country pairs. Corruption distance is defined as the absolute gap between the two 
countries engaging in M&A activity: the acquirer and the target. The literature 
provides empirical evidence that the amount of M&A activity between the acquirer 
and the target depends on the geographical distance between the two countries, on 
· their masses, and on sorne target-specifie factors such as corruption. Exposure to 
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corruption in the home country provides a learning experience, preparing potential 
investors to better handle corruption in markets abroad. Therefore, acquiriDg skills in 
managing corruption helps develop a certain competitive advantage. Andvig (2002) 
suggests that multinational firms exposed to corrupt environments typically have 
learned the organizational and financial techniques required to keep bribes and illegal 
transactions secret. This competitive advantage of expertise in managing corruption 
turns into a disadvantage and becomes useless in transparent markets. On the other 
band, firms from clean countries have a comparative disadvantage in dealing with 
corruption, so they face an additional challenge in conducting business in corrupt 
countries. lnability to handle corruption makes cross-border investment challenging 
for companies from less corrupt countries and can result in a negative investment 
decision. Therefore, this essay hypothesizes that companies from corrupt countries 
have a stronger tendency to invest in corrupt countries than their counterparts from 
less corrupt countries, and firms from cleaner countries prefer to invest in other clean 
countries to avoid additional costs associated with the difference in corruption levels. 
1 test the hypotheses utilizing a Probit model, in a sample of 61 countries over a 19-
year period, to investigate whether corruption distance bas an effect on M&A 
decisions, and then 1 use a panel model to gauge the effect of corruption distance on 
the number and value of M&A between country pairs. The results empirically 
confirm the hypotheses. Corruption distance has a negative effect on the M&A 
location decision and also has a negative effect on the number and volume of M&A 
between country pairs. 1 also find that firms in corrupt countries prefer to merge with 
companies in similarly corrupt countries whose corruption levels are slightly lower 
than theirs. 
Essay three looks at corruption from a different angle. 1 gauge the meçlia's opinion 
about corruption in a country by constructing Media Corruption Perceptions in the 
US. 1 then study their effects on US foreign direct investment outflows to that 
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country. ro construct such a variable, 1 count the number of US media stories that 
cover corruption in a specifie country, and to construct a standardized variable, 1 
discount it by the number of US media stories that cover trades in that country. Sin ce 
the mèdia have a great impact on how 1 view other countries, this essay hypothesizes 
that Media Corruption Perceptions have a negative effect on outward US foreign 
direct ~nvestment towards that country. 1 test the hypothesis by. using a panel of 46 
countries spanning from 2000 to 2015, and 1 empirically fi nd that Media Corruption 
Perceptions are a strong determinant of US foreign direct investment, even after 
introducing the Corruption Perceptions Index in the equation. Media bombard us with 
ali sorts. of stories about foreign countries and can affect our decisions both 
consciously and unconsciously. The abundance of stories covering corruption in 
foreign 'coùntries · can have an impact on the managers' decision to in v est in another 
country. 
This thesis aims to study the mutual relationship between corruption and investm{mt. 
Investment- activity can reduce corruption in a country, whereas corruption can also 
negatively impact inward investment. 
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